WEBVTT

00:00.000 --> 00:23.000
So my name is Kevin Borkner. I'm a PhD student at Cosec. Cosec focuses about everything.

00:23.000 --> 00:27.000
Cryptography related at the University of Kyoliv and Belgium.

00:27.000 --> 00:33.000
And I want to talk about quantum distance bounding, how to advance your proximity.

00:33.000 --> 00:38.000
So the term quantum distance bounding basically divides into two areas.

00:38.000 --> 00:41.000
So you have the quantum part in the distance bounding part.

00:41.000 --> 00:46.000
The distance bounding part is a cryptographic protocol between two communicating parties.

00:46.000 --> 00:52.000
These parties are communicating in such a way that you are able to estimate the physical distance between these two parties.

00:52.000 --> 01:00.000
And quantum in this part basically means that we are relying on quantum mechanics to achieve this physical distance approximation.

01:00.000 --> 01:05.000
Usually when I talk about quantum and cryptography, people confuse these two topics.

01:05.000 --> 01:09.000
So we have quantum cryptography and quantum cryptography.

01:09.000 --> 01:17.000
Post quantum cryptography is basically the development or the upgrade of our current classical cryptography,

01:17.000 --> 01:21.000
because we have the advancements of short algorithm and gross algorithm,

01:21.000 --> 01:25.000
and they currently break our classical systems.

01:25.000 --> 01:28.000
That's why we are developing post quantum cryptography.

01:28.000 --> 01:32.000
It's basically slapping more mathematics on the issues,

01:32.000 --> 01:38.000
and it's not breakable even when we have access to large-scale quantum computers.

01:38.000 --> 01:45.000
On the other hand, we have quantum cryptography, which basically relies on the magic of quantum mechanics.

01:45.000 --> 01:52.000
So these systems are even safe when you have access to unlimited computing power.

01:52.000 --> 01:54.000
In this talk, we're going to focus on the later ones.

01:54.000 --> 02:00.000
So I'm not really, I think I'm the only one in this timetable who focuses on quantum cryptography

02:00.000 --> 02:03.000
and not really on quantum computing in that sense.

02:03.000 --> 02:07.000
All right, I want to start with a problem called a chess grandmaster problem.

02:07.000 --> 02:11.000
So just imagine you have two countries that are involved with each other.

02:11.000 --> 02:14.000
So you have country yellow and country green,

02:14.000 --> 02:20.000
and there's an actual system that got developed during World War II called Identification Friend or Four.

02:20.000 --> 02:21.000
And so how does it work?

02:21.000 --> 02:25.000
So both countries have access to missiles and also two planes.

02:25.000 --> 02:31.000
So what the missile does when it finds a plane flying above the territory,

02:31.000 --> 02:35.000
it gives the plane a challenge, and this plane then responds to this challenge,

02:35.000 --> 02:37.000
so the plane is not shut down.

02:37.000 --> 02:39.000
It's identified as a friend.

02:39.000 --> 02:44.000
So what happens if a missile finds a plane which turns out to be an enemy plane?

02:44.000 --> 02:47.000
The plane, of course, or the pilot is smart, so what they are doing,

02:47.000 --> 02:52.000
they take this challenge, reload it to an airline missile.

02:52.000 --> 02:54.000
This airline missile finds an enemy plane.

02:54.000 --> 02:56.000
The enemy plane doesn't want to get shot, of course.

02:56.000 --> 02:59.000
So it responds to this challenge.

02:59.000 --> 03:05.000
This challenge is really back to the plane and used as the response for the missile from the enemy system.

03:05.000 --> 03:11.000
And with this concept, they're able to circumvent the whole thing and it's actually happened.

03:11.000 --> 03:19.000
So people thought maybe there's an interesting way if we implement clever cryptography

03:19.000 --> 03:23.000
to get rid of this whole problem, turned out that's not the case,

03:23.000 --> 03:30.000
but there is something we can exploit and it's basically the fact that this blue black arrows take way longer

03:30.000 --> 03:33.000
than the communication here on the green side.

03:34.000 --> 03:38.000
So this was kind of the development of distance-bounding protocols,

03:38.000 --> 03:42.000
so it will give you a really high level overview of distance-bounding protocols.

03:42.000 --> 03:47.000
You have a trust-boundary which is pre-determined, so it's basically a physical distance.

03:47.000 --> 03:51.000
You have two communicating parties, the very fire and the prouver.

03:51.000 --> 03:55.000
And these parties are communicating with each other in a challenge response manner,

03:55.000 --> 03:59.000
so what I basically told you, the very fire sensor challenge to the prouver,

03:59.000 --> 04:00.000
the prouver responds to this challenge.

04:01.000 --> 04:05.000
What the very fire does, the very fire stops the time how long it takes for the prouver

04:05.000 --> 04:10.000
to respond to this challenge, once the response is there on the very fire side,

04:10.000 --> 04:14.000
they can estimate the distance between these two parties.

04:14.000 --> 04:19.000
As in this example, the prouver is outside of this trust-boundary, so access is denied.

04:19.000 --> 04:24.000
If we have another party within this trust-boundary, then access is granted.

04:24.000 --> 04:31.000
And if someone tries to trick the system by relaying the challenge, then access is also denied

04:31.000 --> 04:35.000
as basically the slide I showed you before.

04:35.000 --> 04:38.000
And we might be asking where's the quantum party here?

04:38.000 --> 04:42.000
So the traditional or classical distance-bounding protocols,

04:42.000 --> 04:46.000
they usually use as this medium-of-exchange classical bits,

04:46.000 --> 04:50.000
but in our example, we will use Q bits for that.

04:51.000 --> 04:54.000
So you might be asking, why are we doing this?

04:54.000 --> 04:58.000
Why are we not sticking with traditional distance-bounding protocols?

04:58.000 --> 05:01.000
So what's the motivation for quantum distance-bounding protocols?

05:01.000 --> 05:07.000
So there are some issues on the physical layer for classical distance-bounding protocols.

05:07.000 --> 05:11.000
So you have conversion delays from analog to digital communication,

05:11.000 --> 05:16.000
and then you need to do the vice-versa conversion and this introduce some delays.

05:16.000 --> 05:20.000
So the distance measurement isn't as accurate as any more.

05:20.000 --> 05:26.000
Then people thought, okay, maybe switch to full analog processing thing,

05:26.000 --> 05:30.000
so we will get rid of all the digital stuff, to full analog stuff.

05:30.000 --> 05:33.000
Turns out it's also introduced some new attacks,

05:33.000 --> 05:38.000
and people then thought some researchers, okay, how about we change the whole system.

05:38.000 --> 05:43.000
Instead of using radio-frequency, we will use ultrasonic channels to slow the whole protocol down.

05:43.000 --> 05:47.000
Turns out it's also introduced some attack vectors.

05:47.000 --> 05:53.000
So you might be wondering, well, what are some possible applications for quantum distance-bounding?

05:53.000 --> 05:58.000
Usually these two pop up in that case, so you have quantum networks,

05:58.000 --> 06:01.000
which are basically fiber-based quantum networks,

06:01.000 --> 06:05.000
where you have several parties communicating with each other, you have quantum repeater,

06:05.000 --> 06:08.000
and it makes sense to imply quantum distance-bounding there,

06:08.000 --> 06:14.000
to kind of check that these parties are the amount of part, as we expect them,

06:14.000 --> 06:19.000
that they are, so we will kind of have an additional security measurement.

06:19.000 --> 06:23.000
The same can also be applied to satellite to ground communication,

06:23.000 --> 06:28.000
where you have free space links from Earth station and satellites.

06:28.000 --> 06:33.000
And what I want to emphasize on, that to implement quantum distance-bounding protocols,

06:33.000 --> 06:36.000
you don't need a hardware infrastructure upgrade.

06:36.000 --> 06:43.000
If you have quantum networks already in place, it's basically a plug-and-play solution.

06:43.000 --> 06:50.000
So we've talked about entanglement, and usually I'm sure some people already saw this exam,

06:50.000 --> 06:54.000
but I will try to quickly explain entanglement with this one.

06:54.000 --> 07:00.000
So just imagine you have a classical coin flip with two independent coins,

07:00.000 --> 07:03.000
and you flip them at the same time, that's your experiment.

07:03.000 --> 07:08.000
What you are looking for is the outcome, is you have tails tails or heads heads,

07:08.000 --> 07:10.000
so you're looking for the same outcome.

07:10.000 --> 07:14.000
If you have classical coins, you flip them at some stage,

07:14.000 --> 07:18.000
at some point you maybe receive a certain result, tails and heads.

07:18.000 --> 07:24.000
You repeat the whole experiment, and then by some chance you receive heads and heads.

07:24.000 --> 07:30.000
So what I want to point out is that in the classical sense,

07:30.000 --> 07:37.000
if you repeat this experiment a lot of times, then it makes you can have a probability of 50%

07:37.000 --> 07:40.000
to have the same outcome, so tails tails or heads heads.

07:40.000 --> 07:45.000
So what happens if you have some quantum coins that are entangled in a special way?

07:45.000 --> 07:49.000
So you repeat the whole experiment, two coins, you flip them at a time,

07:49.000 --> 07:52.000
then you receive tails tails, then you lie okay, that's crazy.

07:52.000 --> 07:58.000
Let's repeat again, flip them two coins, then you receive heads heads heads.

07:58.000 --> 08:01.000
And if you think like, okay, that's something is off.

08:01.000 --> 08:06.000
Something strange is going on here, then I will congratulate you on this idea,

08:06.000 --> 08:10.000
because you just had a similar idea as Albert Einstein, 93rd or 5.

08:10.000 --> 08:17.000
Where he wrote a paper about it, can quantum mechanical description of physics really be considered complete?

08:17.000 --> 08:22.000
Here the R, yes, that's basically it, you can read about it.

08:22.000 --> 08:27.000
John Stuart Bell came up with the theory about it in 2022.

08:27.000 --> 08:31.000
These three gentlemen's Ellen S. Beck, John F. Gloser and Anton Silinger.

08:31.000 --> 08:36.000
They proved it with the experiments that quantum entanglement is actually a thing.

08:36.000 --> 08:41.000
Okay, with this information, we're able to tackle the quantum distance bounding protocol on a really high level.

08:41.000 --> 08:44.000
So as I told you, you have the two communicating parties.

08:44.000 --> 08:49.000
Here on the left side, we have the very fire and on the right side, we have the proofer.

08:49.000 --> 08:54.000
These two parties agree on a secret key, only known to these two parties.

08:54.000 --> 08:57.000
And as I told you, they are communicating in a challenge response manner,

08:57.000 --> 09:02.000
so the verifier sends the challenge to the proveer, the proveer then responds to this challenge.

09:02.000 --> 09:08.000
The protocol starts by the verifier generating an entangled pair of particles.

09:08.000 --> 09:14.000
Since one half of the particle to the proveer, the other half is kept by the verifier,

09:14.000 --> 09:19.000
what a verifier, that's once this particle leaves the verifier, is it starts the clock.

09:19.000 --> 09:23.000
This is used for this timing measurement that I told you before.

09:23.000 --> 09:29.000
The verifier then, while this particle is flying, the cube is to the proveer,

09:29.000 --> 09:33.000
the verifier measures their own particle and receives some result.

09:33.000 --> 09:38.000
Once this particle reaches the proveer, the proveer also performs the measurement.

09:38.000 --> 09:42.000
And as we learned by the slides before, these two measurements need to be correlated,

09:42.000 --> 09:47.000
because they are basically this quantum coin flip that I just told you about.

09:47.000 --> 09:52.000
So what the proveer then does, the proveer uses this measurement result as the one ingredient,

09:52.000 --> 09:58.000
and the key as the second ingredient, to generate a new cube with this mixture,

09:58.000 --> 10:02.000
then sent over to the verifier as the response.

10:02.000 --> 10:07.000
So this flies to the verifier side, the verifier then stops the clock.

10:07.000 --> 10:13.000
And as I told you this timing component is then used to estimate a distance between these two communicating parties.

10:13.000 --> 10:20.000
So the verifier performs a measurement, and this measurement is determined by the private key.

10:20.000 --> 10:26.000
And if the proveer, generally, did the action on their integral particle,

10:26.000 --> 10:33.000
and if the proveer has access to the secret key, then these two measurement results on the verifier side should be the same,

10:33.000 --> 10:40.000
which means that the proveer was successfully executed, and you can estimate a distance between these two communicating parties.

10:40.000 --> 10:45.000
And you don't do this once, you do this a lot of times, because in quantum mechanics as we already learned,

10:45.000 --> 10:52.000
you have this probabilistic thing, so an attacker has some chance to succeed if you do it only once,

10:52.000 --> 11:01.000
but we repeat this whole proveer a lot of times, and can then use this distance to say how far these two parties are apart.

11:02.000 --> 11:09.000
So in terms of contribution, I use a kiss kit for a lot of my simulations, basically all of them nowadays.

11:09.000 --> 11:15.000
So I first simulated protocols, which are public in this repo.

11:15.000 --> 11:25.000
And I also take, or we also take inspiration from traditional distance bounding protocols, what kinds of attack are applied there,

11:25.000 --> 11:32.000
try to simulate them in our example, to kind of make sure that these do not apply an our protocol is safe, in that sense.

11:32.000 --> 11:37.000
So we've written four papers, I only want, so to be honest.

11:37.000 --> 11:44.000
The rest one is done by my promoters, so the two on the bottom, they do not even use entanglement,

11:44.000 --> 11:52.000
so you only rely on this key, on the secret key, these two parties are sharing with each other.

11:52.000 --> 12:00.000
The second bullet point is a protocol where we have entanglement, and there you have entanglement to have one execution of the whole protocol,

12:00.000 --> 12:07.000
and with that you are able to authenticate not only the sort of verifies not able to authenticate only the proveer,

12:07.000 --> 12:11.000
but also vice versa, so the proveer can authenticate a verifier.

12:11.000 --> 12:21.000
And the first paper, and we will use, we use belts inequality, I won't touch on that, but it's basically an additional security measurement to really see that the proveer generally,

12:21.000 --> 12:26.000
perform the actions on the received particle.

12:26.000 --> 12:32.000
So what are the future plans for now this theoretical idea and theoretical protocol?

12:32.000 --> 12:37.000
First step, should we have a former security analysis?

12:37.000 --> 12:42.000
So what I told you about is that we are looking at some attacks in the traditional distance bounding protocols,

12:42.000 --> 12:47.000
but we want to have a proper security proof in that sense, once this is done,

12:47.000 --> 12:54.000
and we are finally sure that our protocol is secure, we move on to an experimental setup,

12:54.000 --> 13:00.000
so I am in contact with some experimental physicists that already have some experience in that domain,

13:00.000 --> 13:05.000
so we want to have this distance bounding quantum distance bounding protocol on a really small scale,

13:05.000 --> 13:12.000
so in some lab setting, and once this is also working as intended, then we can scale this up to some bigger distance.

13:12.000 --> 13:18.000
So the two final takeaways of this presentation are first with a quantum distance bounding protocol,

13:18.000 --> 13:27.000
you are not only able to ensure who you are talking to, but you also able to identify how far the other party is apart from you,

13:27.000 --> 13:31.000
and the second point is with quantum distance bounding protocol.

13:31.000 --> 13:40.000
It's basically a plug-and-place solution, you have seamless integration in networks where you already have this quantum hardware in place.

13:41.000 --> 13:44.000
That's it from my side, I am happy to take any questions.

13:53.000 --> 13:54.000
Yeah?

14:03.000 --> 14:09.000
So the question is the difference between the classical distance bounding and quantum distance bounding,

14:10.000 --> 14:18.000
maybe I will skip to this slide, so I know I didn't cover all of the details how cubits work,

14:18.000 --> 14:27.000
but I have some really interesting properties, so for classical distance bounding, you are exchanging classical bits, as we know them,

14:27.000 --> 14:34.000
and for the quantum part, you exchange cubits for this part, and they have some interesting properties, as I said, this entanglement thing,

14:34.000 --> 14:45.000
is once that make them unique, they have no cloning theorem, so you are basically not able to copy and paste, as we know it in our usual normal world,

14:45.000 --> 14:52.000
and another property is when you have an eavesdropper that wants to make a measurement on this cubit, it basically destroys it.

14:52.000 --> 14:59.000
So you are not able, if you have an eavesdropper on adversary that sits between these two communicating parties,

14:59.000 --> 15:04.000
wants to pick up a cubit and read it, and then sense it over what this doesn't work.

15:04.000 --> 15:08.000
That's a really fundamental physical thing in quantum mechanics.

15:08.000 --> 15:13.000
So this is some advantage that we use, that's why we are translated to quantum distance bounding,

15:13.000 --> 15:19.000
but the general idea is the same, so that is answer your question.

15:20.000 --> 15:28.000
Can I follow you from there, then I understand that you cannot like to know it, but if you, but if ultimately what you want to do,

15:28.000 --> 15:34.000
extend back the cubit with some additional stuff, or if you want to find that you are the friend of the enemy,

15:34.000 --> 15:43.000
are you not also then able to descend the cubit that goes into you around and kind of do the same thing, as you have it.

15:43.000 --> 15:51.000
So you're basically, what you're trying, the question is if you're not basically able to reflect or incoming cubit right as a challenge,

15:51.000 --> 15:55.000
so it's basically sending a mirror in between.

15:55.000 --> 15:58.000
Yeah, you get sent to like the cubit with some challenge.

15:58.000 --> 16:03.000
Yeah, obviously you are, let's say the enemy in this case, so you know you can return the challenge correctly.

16:03.000 --> 16:11.000
So you just send it to your own missile, which then sends it to you as if it's, oh, this is our own quantum thing,

16:11.000 --> 16:16.000
but you know what I mean, like the same thing that happened in the war in the, yeah, yeah.

16:16.000 --> 16:21.000
I will use maybe this, I don't know if it's answers your question, so basically sending the incoming cubit back,

16:21.000 --> 16:24.000
I don't know if I cover this correctly.

16:24.000 --> 16:25.000
So stop it.

16:25.000 --> 16:33.000
No, what happened in the war war two, that you said was like that you send that challenge around basically to a friend,

16:33.000 --> 16:41.000
so let's say 48, the challenge to 40 people to be kind of like, reply it to the missile that is connected to it,

16:41.000 --> 16:46.000
and then you ask a plane from 48 to basically do this proof and when it sends it back,

16:46.000 --> 16:49.000
kind of disrupted all the way back around.

16:49.000 --> 16:55.000
But that's basically, so the question is if in this example, I showed with missiles and planes,

16:55.000 --> 17:00.000
if it's not able to kind of root the cubit or the challenge in a clever way, right?

17:01.000 --> 17:07.000
To mitigate the whole thing, but that's the timing component component that we have here, which makes it not possible.

17:07.000 --> 17:14.000
So if someone tries to root anything, it's, so you have here sending the cubits or photons in that sense,

17:14.000 --> 17:18.000
so you have to speed up light as fast as possible, so it can go any faster,

17:18.000 --> 17:24.000
and you basically have this timing component, so it's not able for someone.

17:24.000 --> 17:28.000
It would be spotted if you take your the cubit, send it to somewhere else, send it there,

17:28.000 --> 17:30.000
and back and forth and it doesn't work.

17:30.000 --> 17:38.000
So in another point, it's the secret key, so the thing is the proof that that's not only received the cubit,

17:38.000 --> 17:43.000
but the proof also performs this action on the cubit, right?

17:43.000 --> 17:51.000
So therefore, only if they have to access to the key, and also use the entangle cubit they received,

17:51.000 --> 17:54.000
then they are able to send the correct response.

17:55.000 --> 18:01.000
Okay, but also if the timing is kind of what makes the difference, the timing can also be used successfully.

18:01.000 --> 18:07.000
Yeah, the timing is also a thing in the traditional distance bounding protocols.

18:07.000 --> 18:12.000
That's not a unique thing to quantum distance bounding, but maybe we are having some issues,

18:12.000 --> 18:15.000
but we can talk anywhere else after the presentation.

18:15.000 --> 18:17.000
So I have two questions.

18:17.000 --> 18:22.000
First of all, we have a mission to exchange a key at quantum distance bounding protocol.

18:22.000 --> 18:29.000
So how do we have two parties choose the basis in which they imagine a key or a key?

18:29.000 --> 18:32.000
Is it chosen random or in fixed basis?

18:32.000 --> 18:40.000
So in this example, we have the orange basis, you there are fixed, in this example.

18:40.000 --> 18:50.000
So we have this M correlation, and for this part we have the proof of the Peter question.

18:50.000 --> 18:55.000
So the question is how are the basis chosen basically in the protocol?

18:55.000 --> 19:00.000
For this example, the key basically determines the basis.

19:00.000 --> 19:09.000
So if the key is binary, if the key is zero, and this thing then we use the computational basis,

19:09.000 --> 19:16.000
and if it's one, we use the hard amount basis, and with this it verifies

19:16.000 --> 19:21.000
also able to correctly decode the incoming keyword.

19:21.000 --> 19:23.000
And that's like a question as well.

19:23.000 --> 19:26.000
We have like physical properties of the human exchange.

19:26.000 --> 19:30.000
Like at the end of the talk, you mentioned like military applications like IFF.

19:30.000 --> 19:31.000
Yeah.

19:31.000 --> 19:35.000
How would you exchange a coherent keyword stage in such a situation?

19:35.000 --> 19:39.000
Like if you use polarised photons, you have to aim pretty precisely.

19:39.000 --> 19:40.000
Yeah.

19:40.000 --> 19:41.000
Yeah, that's right.

19:41.000 --> 19:49.000
So the question is how to make this cubic exchange, also with regards to this military example, I showed in the beginning.

19:49.000 --> 19:50.000
Yeah, that's right.

19:50.000 --> 19:54.000
It also comes down to these applications of quantum distance bounding protocol.

19:54.000 --> 19:57.000
And I have a lot of slides.

19:57.000 --> 20:00.000
So here it's read forward for quantum networks.

20:00.000 --> 20:01.000
Right.

20:01.000 --> 20:02.000
You have fiber.

20:02.000 --> 20:03.000
They are fiber based.

20:03.000 --> 20:05.000
So it's easy to communicate.

20:05.000 --> 20:10.000
But I get that's of course an interest and good point that you're pointing out here.

20:10.000 --> 20:17.000
That the satellite or ground communication, they need to be really accurate in a certain angle to make this exchange possible.

20:17.000 --> 20:20.000
And also you need to this line of size.

20:20.000 --> 20:22.000
So it's also better dependent.

20:22.000 --> 20:23.000
But yeah.

20:23.000 --> 20:25.000
I'm not really on this physical side.

20:25.000 --> 20:28.000
So I can't give you a satisfying answer on that sense.

20:28.000 --> 20:29.000
But yeah.

20:29.000 --> 20:32.000
Of course, there are, you have quantum key distribution.

20:32.000 --> 20:34.000
I maybe you've heard of that.

20:34.000 --> 20:35.000
Yeah.

20:35.000 --> 20:40.000
There are also, they use this satellite to ground communication over a really, really long distance.

20:40.000 --> 20:42.000
The Chinese did it with like, I don't know.

20:42.000 --> 20:45.000
400, 500 kilometers.

20:45.000 --> 20:46.000
So it's possible.

20:46.000 --> 20:47.000
It's feasible.

20:47.000 --> 20:49.000
But I don't know how they exactly pull this one off.

20:49.000 --> 20:50.000
Yeah.

20:50.000 --> 21:07.000
In our example, we want to have a communication from the ground to the satellite and

21:07.000 --> 21:08.000
forward.

21:08.000 --> 21:09.000
Back and forth.

21:09.000 --> 21:22.000
If you want to authenticate the satellite, yeah.

21:22.000 --> 21:23.000
Yeah.

21:23.000 --> 21:24.000
Yeah.

21:24.000 --> 21:25.000
Yeah.

21:25.000 --> 21:26.000
That's a good point.

21:26.000 --> 21:30.000
We're working on that.

21:30.000 --> 21:35.000
On purpose that we are.

21:36.000 --> 21:38.000
Is it possible to call it the question?

21:38.000 --> 21:45.000
Is it possible to combine our quantum distance bounding protocol with quantum key distribution protocol?

21:45.000 --> 21:47.000
And it is.

21:47.000 --> 21:49.000
But I didn't mention it.

21:49.000 --> 21:55.000
So the thing is the outcome of quantum key distribution protocol is this one time pad that

21:55.000 --> 21:57.000
both parties agreed on.

21:57.000 --> 22:02.000
And basically, you can first have a quantum key distribution protocol in our protocol afterwards.

22:02.000 --> 22:08.000
It didn't mention it in this way because it may look like our quantum distance bounding protocol

22:08.000 --> 22:10.000
depends on QKD, which is not the case.

22:10.000 --> 22:14.000
You can also have some other kind of key exchange.

22:14.000 --> 22:17.000
But of course, it's an easy target.

22:17.000 --> 22:18.000
So it's an easy thing.

22:18.000 --> 22:23.000
You can conclude those two and a really nice thing is that you have to same hardware on both sides.

22:23.000 --> 22:27.000
So for quantum key distribution also for quantum distance bounding, you will use the same hardware.

22:27.000 --> 22:30.000
So if it's already in place, why not also extend it?

22:30.000 --> 22:33.000
Thanks, Kevin.

