





Network Working Group                                        G. Giaretta
Request for Comments: 5637                                      Qualcomm
Category: Informational                                      I. Guardini
                                                              E. Demaria
                                                          Telecom Italia
                                                            J. Bournelle
                                                             Orange Labs
                                                                R. Lopez
                                                    University of Murcia
                                                          September 2009


       Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA) Goals
                            for Mobile IPv6

Abstract

   In commercial and enterprise deployments, Mobile IPv6 can be a
   service offered by a Mobility Services Provider (MSP).  In this case,
   all protocol operations may need to be explicitly authorized and
   traced, requiring the interaction between Mobile IPv6 and the AAA
   infrastructure.  Integrating the Authentication, Authorization, and
   Accounting (AAA) infrastructure (e.g., Network Access Server and AAA
   server) also offers a solution component for Mobile IPv6
   bootstrapping.  This document describes various scenarios where a AAA
   interface for Mobile IPv6 is required.  Additionally, it lists design
   goals and requirements for such an interface.

Status of This Memo

   This memo provides information for the Internet community.  It does
   not specify an Internet standard of any kind.  Distribution of this
   memo is unlimited.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2009 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the BSD License.



Giaretta, et al.             Informational                      [Page 1]

RFC 5637               AAA Goals for Mobile IPv6          September 2009


   This document may contain material from IETF Documents or IETF
   Contributions published or made publicly available before November
   10, 2008.  The person(s) controlling the copyright in some of this
   material may not have granted the IETF Trust the right to allow
   modifications of such material outside the IETF Standards Process.
   Without obtaining an adequate license from the person(s) controlling
   the copyright in such materials, this document may not be modified
   outside the IETF Standards Process, and derivative works of it may
   not be created outside the IETF Standards Process, except to format
   it for publication as an RFC or to translate it into languages other
   than English.

Table of Contents

   1. Introduction ....................................................3
   2. Terminology .....................................................3
   3. Motivation ......................................................4
   4. Bootstrapping Scenarios .........................................4
      4.1. Split Scenario .............................................5
      4.2. Integrated Scenario ........................................6
   5. Goals for AAA-HA Interface ......................................6
      5.1. General Goals ..............................................6
      5.2. Service Authorization ......................................7
      5.3. Accounting .................................................8
      5.4. Mobile Node Authentication .................................8
      5.5. Provisioning of Configuration Parameters ...................8
   6. Goals for the AAA-NAS Interface .................................9
   7. Security Considerations .........................................9
   8. Acknowledgements ................................................9
   9. References .....................................................10
      9.1. Normative References ......................................10
      9.2. Informative References ....................................10



















Giaretta, et al.             Informational                      [Page 2]

RFC 5637               AAA Goals for Mobile IPv6          September 2009


1.  Introduction

   Mobile IPv6 [1] provides the basic IP mobility functionality for
   IPv6.  When Mobile IPv6 is used in tightly managed environments with
   the use of the AAA (Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting)
   infrastructure, an interface between Mobile IPv6 and AAA protocols
   needs to be defined.  Also, two scenarios for bootstrapping Mobile
   IPv6 service [2], i.e., split [3] and integrated [6] scenarios,
   require the specification of a message exchange between the Home
   Agent (HA) and AAA infrastructure for authentication and
   authorization purposes and a message exchange between the AAA server
   and the NAS in order to provide the visited network with the
   necessary configuration information (e.g., Home Agent address).

   This document describes various scenarios where a AAA interface is
   required.  Additionally, it lists design goals and requirements for
   the communication between the HA and the AAA server and between the
   NAS and the AAA server needed in the split and integrated scenarios.
   Requirements are listed in case either IPsec or RFC 4285 [4] is used
   for Mobile IPv6 authentication.

   This document only describes requirements, goals, and scenarios.  It
   does not provide solutions.

   Notice that this document builds on the security model of the AAA
   infrastructure.  As such, the end host/user shares credentials with
   the home AAA server and the communication between the AAA server and
   the AAA client may be protected.  If the AAA server and the AAA
   client are not part of the same administrative domain, then some sort
   of contractual relationship between the involved administrative
   domains is typically in place in the form of roaming agreements.

2.  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [5], with the
   qualification that, unless otherwise stated, these words apply to the
   design of the AAA protocol extension, not its implementation or its
   usage.

   The following terms are extracted from [2].

   o  Access Service Authorizer (ASA).  A network operator that
      authenticates a Mobile Node and establishes the Mobile Node's
      authorization to receive Internet service.





Giaretta, et al.             Informational                      [Page 3]

RFC 5637               AAA Goals for Mobile IPv6          September 2009


   o  Access Service Provider (ASP).  A network operator that provides
      direct IP packet forwarding to and from the end host.

   o  Mobility Service Authorizer (MSA).  A service provider that
      authorizes Mobile IPv6 service.

   o  Mobility Service Provider (MSP).  A service provider that provides
      Mobile IPv6 service.  In order to obtain such service, the Mobile
      Node must be authenticated and prove authorization to obtain the
      service.

3.  Motivation

   Mobile IPv6 specification [1] requires that Mobile Nodes (MNs) are
   provisioned with a set of configuration parameters -- namely, the
   Home Address and the Home Agent Address, in order to accomplish a
   home registration.  Moreover, MNs and Home Agents (HAs) must share
   the cryptographic material needed in order to set up IPsec security
   associations to protect Mobile IPv6 signaling (e.g., shared keys or
   certificates).  This is referred as the bootstrapping problem: as
   described in [2], the AAA infrastructure can be used as the central
   element to enable dynamic Mobile IPv6 bootstrapping.  In this case,
   the AAA infrastructure can be exploited to offload the end host's
   authentication to the AAA server as well as to deliver the necessary
   configuration parameters to the visited network (e.g., Home Agent
   address as specified in [6]).

   Moreover, in case Mobile IPv6 is a service offered by a Mobility
   Service Provider (MSP), all protocol operations (e.g., home
   registrations) may need to be explicitly authorized and monitored
   (e.g., for accounting purposes).  This can be accomplished relying on
   the AAA infrastructure of the Mobility Service Authorizer (MSA) that
   stores user profiles and credentials.

4.  Bootstrapping Scenarios

   This section describes some bootstrapping scenarios in which
   communication between the AAA infrastructure of the Mobility Service
   Provider and the Home Agent is needed.  The need of MIPv6-aware
   communication between the AAA server and the Network Access Server
   (NAS) is also described.  The purpose of this section is only to
   explain the situation where bootstrapping is required.  The actual
   mechanisms and additional details are specified elsewhere or are left
   for future work (see, e.g., [2], [3], and [6]).







Giaretta, et al.             Informational                      [Page 4]

RFC 5637               AAA Goals for Mobile IPv6          September 2009


4.1.  Split Scenario

   In the split scenario [3], there is the assumption that the mobility
   service and network access service are not provided by the same
   administrative entity.  This implies that the mobility service is
   authorized by the MSA that is a different entity from the ASA.

   In this scenario, the Mobile Node discovers the Home Agent Address
   using the Domain Name Service (DNS).  It queries the address based on
   the Home Agent name or by service name.  In the former case, the
   Mobile Node is configured with the Fully Qualified Domain Name (FDQN)
   of the Home Agent.  In the latter case, [3] defines a new service
   resource record (SRV RR).

   Then the Mobile Node performs an IKEv2 [7] exchange with the HA to
   set up IPsec Security Associations (SAs) to protect Mobile IPv6
   signaling and to configure its Home Address (HoA).  Mutual
   authentication for IKEv2 between Mobile Node and Home Agent can be
   done with or without use of the Extensible Authentication Protocol
   (EAP).

   If EAP is used for authentication, the operator can choose any
   available EAP methods.  Use of EAP with the AAA infrastructure allows
   the HA to check the validity of each MN's credentials with the AAA
   infrastructure, rather than having to maintain credentials for each
   MN itself.  It also allows roaming in terms of Mobile IPv6 service
   where the MSP and MSA belong to different administrative domains.  In
   this case, the HA in the MSP can check the validity of the
   credentials provided by the MN with the AAA infrastructure of MSA,
   receiving the relevant authorization information.

   The Mobile Node may also want to update its FQDN in the DNS with the
   newly allocated Home Address. [3] recommends that the HA performs the
   DNS entry update on behalf of the Mobile Node.  For that purpose, the
   Mobile Node indicates its FDQN in the IKEv2 exchange (in the IDi
   field in IKE_AUTH) and adds a DNS Update Option in the Binding Update
   message sent to the HA.

   When the Mobile Node uses a Home Agent belonging to a different
   administrative domain (MSP != MSA), the local HA may not share a
   security association with the home DNS server.  In this case, [3]
   suggests that the home AAA server is responsible for the update.
   Thus, the HA should send to the home AAA server the (FDQN, HoA) pair.








Giaretta, et al.             Informational                      [Page 5]

RFC 5637               AAA Goals for Mobile IPv6          September 2009


4.2.  Integrated Scenario

   In the integrated scenario, the assumption is that the Access Service
   Authorizer (ASA) is the same as the Mobility Service Authorizer
   (MSA).  Further details of this type of a scenario are being worked
   on separately [6].

   The Home Agent can be assigned either in the Access Service
   Provider's network or in the separate network.  In the former case,
   the MSP is the same entity as the ASP, whereas in the latter case the
   MSP and ASP are different entities.

   In this scenario, the Mobile Node discovers the Home Agent Address
   using DHCPv6.  If the user is authorized for Mobile IPv6 service,
   during the network access authentication the AAAH (the AAA server in
   the home network) sends the information about the assigned Home Agent
   to the NAS where the Mobile Node is currently attached.  To request
   Home Agent data, the Mobile Node sends a DHCPv6 Information Request
   to the All_DHCP_Relay_Agents_and_Servers multicast address.  With
   this request, the Mobile Node can specify if it wants a Home Agent
   provided by the visited domain (ASP/MSP) or by the home domain
   (ASA/MSA).  In both cases, the NAS acts a DHCPv6 relay.  When the NAS
   receives the DHCPv6 Information Request, it passes Home Agent
   information received from the AAAH server to the DHCP server, for
   instance using mechanisms defined in [6].

   In case the Mobile Node cannot acquire Home Agent information via
   DHCPv6, it can try the default mechanism based on DNS described in
   [3].  After the Mobile Node has acquired the Home Agent information,
   the mechanisms used to bootstrap the HoA, the IPsec Security
   Association, and the authentication and authorization with the MSA
   are the same as described in the bootstrapping solution for the split
   scenario [3].

5.  Goals for AAA-HA Interface

   Section 4 raises the need to define extensions for the AAA protocol
   used between the AAA server of the MSA and the HA.  The following
   sections list the goals for such an interface.  This communication is
   needed for both the split and integrated scenarios.

5.1.  General Goals

   G1.1  The communication between the AAAH server and the HA MUST reuse
         existing AAA security mechanisms with regard to authentication,
         replay, integrity, and confidentiality protection.  These
         communication security mechanisms prevent a number of classical




Giaretta, et al.             Informational                      [Page 6]

RFC 5637               AAA Goals for Mobile IPv6          September 2009


         threats, including the alteration of exchanged data (e.g.,
         Mobile IPv6 configuration parameters) and the installation of
         unauthorized state.

5.2.  Service Authorization

   G2.1  The AAA-HA interface MUST allow the use of a Network Access
         Identifier (NAI) to identify the user.

   G2.2  The HA MUST be able to query the AAAH server to verify Mobile
         IPv6 service authorization for the Mobile Node.

   G2.3  The AAAH server MAY assign explicit operational limitations and
         authorization restrictions on the HA (e.g., packet filters, QoS
         parameters).

   G2.4  The AAAH server MUST be able to send an authorization lifetime
         to the HA to limit Mobile IPv6 session duration for the MN.

   G2.5  The HA MUST be able to request that the AAAH server grant an
         extension of the authorization lifetime to the MN.

   G2.6  The AAAH server MUST be able to force the HA to terminate an
         active Mobile IPv6 session for authorization policy reasons
         (e.g., credit exhaustion).

   G2.7  The HA MUST be able to indicate to the AAAH server the IPv6 HoA
         that will be assigned to the MN.

   G2.8  The AAAH server MUST be able to authorize the MN to use an IPv6
         HoA and MUST indicate that to the HA.

   G2.9  The AAAH server MUST be able to indicate to the HA whether or
         not the return routability test (HoT (Home Test) and HoTi (Home
         Test Init)) shall be permitted via the HA for a given MN.

   G2.10 The AAAH server MUST be able to support different levels of
         Mobile IPv6 authorization.  For example, the AAAH server may
         authorize the MN to use MIPv6 (as defined in [1]) or may
         authorize the MN to utilize an IPv4 HoA assigned for Dual Stack
         MIPv6 [8].

   G2.11 The AAAH server MUST be able to indicate to the HA whether the
         bearer traffic for the MN needs to receive IPsec Encapsulating
         Security Payload (ESP) protection.






Giaretta, et al.             Informational                      [Page 7]

RFC 5637               AAA Goals for Mobile IPv6          September 2009


   G2.12 The HA MUST be able to authenticate the MN through the AAAH
         server in case a pre-shared key is used in IKEv2 for user
         authentication.  The exact procedure is part of the solution
         space.

5.3.  Accounting

   G3.1  The AAA-HA interface MUST support the transfer of accounting
         records needed for service control and charging.  These include
         (but may not be limited to): time of binding cache entry
         creation and deletion, octets sent and received by the Mobile
         Node in bi-directional tunneling, etc.

5.4.  Mobile Node Authentication

   G4.1  The AAA-HA interface MUST allow the HA to act as a pass-through
         EAP authenticator.

   G4.2  The AAA-HA interface MUST support authentication based on the
         Mobility Message Authentication Options defined in [4].

   G4.3  The AAAH server MUST be able to provide a MN-HA key (or data
         used for subsequent key derivation of the MN-HA key by the HA)
         to the HA if requested.  Additional data, such as the Security
         Parameter Index (SPI) or lifetime parameters, are sent along
         with the keying material.

   G4.4  The HA supporting the Authentication Protocol MUST be able to
         request that the AAAH server authenticate the MN with the value
         in the MN-AAA Mobility Message Authentication Option.

   G4.5  The HA MUST include an identifier of the Mobile Node in the AAA
         transactions with the AAAH server.

5.5.  Provisioning of Configuration Parameters

   o  The HA SHOULD be able to communicate to the AAAH server the Home
      Address allocated to the MN and the FQDN of the MN (e.g., for
      allowing the AAAH server to perform a DNS update on behalf of the
      MN).

   o The AAAH server SHOULD be able to indicate to the HA if the MN is
      authorized to autoconfigure its Home Address.  If the AAAH does
      not indicate to the HA if a MN is authorized to autoconfigure its
      address, the MN is not authorized.






Giaretta, et al.             Informational                      [Page 8]

RFC 5637               AAA Goals for Mobile IPv6          September 2009


6.  Goals for the AAA-NAS Interface

   In the integrated scenario, the AAA server provides the HA
   information to the NAS as part of the whole AAA operation for network
   access.

   G6.1  The AAAH server MUST be able to communicate the Home Agent
         Information (IP address or FQDN) to the NAS.

   G6.2  The NAS MUST be able to notify the AAAH server if it supports
         the AAA extensions designed to receive the HA assignment
         information.

   G6.3  The ASP/MSP supporting the allocation of a Home Agent MUST be
         able to indicate to the MSA if it can allocate a Home Agent to
         the MN.  Therefore, the NAS MUST be able to include a suggested
         HA address in the ASP in the AAA-NAS interaction.

   G6.4  The AAA server of the MSA MUST be able to indicate to the NAS
         whether the MN is authorized to use a local Home Agent (i.e., a
         Home Agent in the ASP/MSP).

   G6.5  The overall AAA solution for the integrated scenario MUST
         support the scenario where the AAA server of the ASA/MSA used
         for network access authentication is different from the AAA
         server used for mobility service authentication and
         authorization.

7.  Security Considerations

   As stated in Section 5.1, the AAA-HA interface must provide mutual
   authentication, integrity, and replay protection.  Furthermore, if
   security parameters (e.g., IKE pre-shared key) are transferred
   through this interface, confidentiality is strongly recommended to be
   supported.  In this case, the links between the HA and the AAA server
   of the MSA and between the NAS and the AAA server MUST be secure.

8.  Acknowledgements

   The authors would like to thank James Kempf, Alper Yegin, Vijay
   Devarapalli, Basavaraj Patil, Gopal Dommety, Marcelo Bagnulo, and
   Madjid Nakhjiri for their comments and feedback.  Moreover, the
   authors would like to thank Hannes Tschofenig for his deep technical
   and editorial review of the document.  Finally the authors would like
   to thank Kuntal Chowdhury who contributed by identifying the goals
   related to RFC 4285 authentication.





Giaretta, et al.             Informational                      [Page 9]

RFC 5637               AAA Goals for Mobile IPv6          September 2009


9.  References

9.1.  Normative References

   [1]  Johnson, D., Perkins, C., and J. Arkko, "Mobility Support in
        IPv6", RFC 3775, June 2004.

   [2]  Patel, A. and G. Giaretta, "Problem Statement for bootstrapping
        Mobile IPv6 (MIPv6)", RFC 4640, September 2006.

   [3]  Giaretta, G., Kempf, J., and V. Devarapalli, "Mobile IPv6
        Bootstrapping in Split Scenario", RFC 5026, October 2007.

   [4]  Patel, A., Leung, K., Khalil, M., Akhtar, H., and K. Chowdhury,
        "Authentication Protocol for Mobile IPv6", RFC 4285, January
        2006.

   [5]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
        Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

9.2.  Informative References

   [6]  Chowdhury, K., Ed., and A. Yegin, "MIP6-bootstrapping for the
        Integrated Scenario", Work in Progress, April 2008.

   [7]  Kaufman, C., "Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol", RFC 4306,
        December 2005.

   [8]  Soliman, H., Ed., "Mobile IPv6 Support for Dual Stack Hosts and
        Routers", RFC 5555, June 2009.





















Giaretta, et al.             Informational                     [Page 10]

RFC 5637               AAA Goals for Mobile IPv6          September 2009


Authors' Addresses

   Gerardo Giaretta
   Qualcomm
   5775 Morehouse Drive
   San Diego, CA  92109
   USA

   EMail: gerardo@qualcomm.com


   Ivano Guardini
   Telecom Italia Lab
   via G. Reiss Romoli, 274
   TORINO  10148
   Italy

   EMail: ivano.guardini@telecomitalia.it


   Elena Demaria
   Telecom Italia Lab
   via G. Reiss Romoli, 274
   TORINO  10148
   Italy

   EMail: elena.demaria@telecomitalia.it


   Julien Bournelle
   Orange Labs

   EMail: julien.bournelle@gmail.com


   Rafa Marin Lopez
   University of Murcia
   30071 Murcia
   Spain

   EMail: rafa@dif.um.es










Giaretta, et al.             Informational                     [Page 11]

