





Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)                   V. Gurbani, Ed.
Request for Comments: 5923             Bell Laboratories, Alcatel-Lucent
Category: Standards Track                                        R. Mahy
ISSN: 2070-1721                                             Unaffiliated
                                                                 B. Tate
                                                               BroadSoft
                                                               June 2010


       Connection Reuse in the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)

Abstract

   This document enables a pair of communicating proxies to reuse a
   congestion-controlled connection between themselves for sending
   requests in the forwards and backwards direction.  Because the
   connection is essentially aliased for requests going in the backwards
   direction, reuse is predicated upon both the communicating endpoints
   authenticating themselves using X.509 certificates through Transport
   Layer Security (TLS).  For this reason, we only consider connection
   reuse for TLS over TCP and TLS over Stream Control Transmission
   Protocol (SCTP).  This document also provides guidelines on
   connection reuse and virtual SIP servers and the interaction of
   connection reuse and DNS SRV lookups in SIP.

Status of This Memo

   This is an Internet Standards Track document.

   This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
   (IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF community.  It has
   received public review and has been approved for publication by the
   Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Further information on
   Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 5741.

   Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
   and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
   http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5923.













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Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction ...................................................3
   2.  Terminology ....................................................4
   3.  Applicability Statement ........................................5
   4.  Benefits of TLS Connection Reuse ...............................5
   5.  Overview of Operation ..........................................6
   6.  Requirements ..................................................10
   7.  Formal Syntax .................................................11
   8.  Normative Behavior ............................................11
     8.1.  Client Behavior ...........................................11
     8.2.  Server Behavior ...........................................13
     8.3.  Closing a TLS Connection ..................................14
   9.  Security Considerations .......................................14
     9.1.  Authenticating TLS Connections: Client View ...............14
     9.2.  Authenticating TLS Connections: Server View ...............15
     9.3.  Connection Reuse and Virtual Servers ......................15
   10. Connection Reuse and SRV Interaction ..........................17
   11. IANA Considerations ...........................................17
   12. Acknowledgments ...............................................17
   13. References ....................................................18
     13.1. Normative References ......................................18
     13.2. Informative References ....................................18













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1.  Introduction

   SIP entities can communicate using either unreliable/connectionless
   (e.g., UDP) or reliable/connection-oriented (e.g., TCP, SCTP
   [RFC4960]) transport protocols.  When SIP entities use a connection-
   oriented protocol (such as TCP or SCTP) to send a request, they
   typically originate their connections from an ephemeral port.

   In the following example, A listens for SIP requests over TLS on TCP
   port 5061 (the default port for SIP over TLS over TCP), but uses an
   ephemeral port (port 49160) for a new connection to B.  These
   entities could be SIP user agents or SIP proxy servers.

          +-----------+ 49160 (UAC)     5061 (UAS) +-----------+
          |           |--------------------------->|           |
          |  Entity   |                            |  Entity   |
          |     A     |                            |     B     |
          |           | 5061 (UAS)                 |           |
          +-----------+                            +-----------+

       Figure 1: Uni-directional connection for requests from A to B

   The SIP protocol includes the notion of a persistent connection
   (defined in Section 2), which is a mechanisms to insure that
   responses to a request reuse the existing connection that is
   typically still available, as well as reusing the existing
   connections for other requests sent by the originator of the
   connection.  However, new requests sent in the backwards direction --
   in the example above, requests from B destined to A -- are unlikely
   to reuse the existing connection.  This frequently causes a pair of
   SIP entities to use one connection for requests sent in each
   direction, as shown below.

          +-----------+ 49160             5061 +-----------+
          |           |.......................>|           |
          |  Entity   |                        |  Entity   |
          |     A     | 5061             49170 |     B     |
          |           |<-----------------------|           |
          +-----------+                        +-----------+

          Figure 2: Two connections for requests between A and B

   Unlike TCP, TLS connections can be reused to send requests in the
   backwards direction since each end can be authenticated when the
   connection is initially set up.  Once the authentication step has
   been performed, the situation can thought to resemble the picture in
   Figure 1 except that A and B both use a single shared connection, for




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   example, between port 49160 on A and port 5061 on B.  When A wants to
   send a request to B, it will reuse this connection, and when B wants
   to send a request to A, it will reuse the same connection.

2.  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

   Additional terminology used in this document:

   Advertised address:  The address that occurs in the Via header
      field's sent-by production rule, including the port number and
      transport.

   Alias:  Reusing an existing connection to send requests in the
      backwards direction; i.e., A opens a connection to B to send a
      request, and B uses that connection to send requests in the
      backwards direction to A.

   Connection reuse:  See "Alias".

   Persistent connection:  The process of sending multiple, possibly
      unrelated requests on the same connection, and receiving responses
      on that connection as well.  More succinctly, A opens a connection
      to B to send a request, and later reuses the same connection to
      send other requests, possibly unrelated to the dialog established
      by the first request.  Responses will arrive over the same
      connection.  Persistent connection behavior is specified in
      Section 18 of RFC 3261 [RFC3261].  Persistent connections do not
      imply connection reuse.

   Resolved address:  The network identifiers (IP address, port,
      transport) associated with a user agent as a result of executing
      RFC 3263 [RFC3263] on a Uniform Resource Identifier (URI).

   Shared connection:  See "Persistent connection".













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3.  Applicability Statement

   The applicability of the mechanism described in this document is for
   two adjacent SIP entities to reuse connections when they are agnostic
   about the direction of the connection, i.e., either end can initiate
   the connection.  SIP entities that can only open a connection in a
   specific direction -- perhaps because of Network Address Translation
   (NAT) and firewalls -- reuse their connections using the mechanism
   described in the outbound document [RFC5626].

   This memo concerns connection reuse, not persistent connections (see
   definitions of these in Section 2).  Behavior for persistent
   connections is specified in Section 18 of RFC 3261 [RFC3261] and is
   not altered by this memo.

   This memo documents that it is good practice to only reuse those
   connections where the identity of the sender can be verified by the
   receiver.  Thus, TLS (RFC 5246 [RFC5246]) connections (over any
   connection-oriented transport) formed by exchanging X.509
   certificates can be reused because they authoritatively establish
   identities of the communicating parties (see Section 5).

4.  Benefits of TLS Connection Reuse

   Opening an extra connection where an existing one is sufficient can
   result in potential scaling and performance problems.  Each new
   connection using TLS requires a TCP three-way handshake, a handful of
   round trips to establish TLS, typically expensive asymmetric
   authentication and key generation algorithms, and certificate
   verification.  This can lead to a build up of considerable queues as
   the server CPU saturates by the TLS handshakes it is already
   performing (Section 6.19 of Rescorla [Book-Rescorla-TLS]).

   Consider the call flow shown below where Proxy A and Proxy B use the
   Record-Route mechanism to stay involved in a dialog.  Proxy B will
   establish a new TLS connection just to send a BYE request.















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                      Proxy A    Proxy B
                         |          |
     Create connection 1 +---INV--->|
                         |          |
                         |<---200---+ Response over connection 1
                         |          |
     Reuse connection 1  +---ACK--->|
                         |          |
                         =          =
                         |          |
                         |<---BYE---+ Create connection 2
                         |          |
          Response over  +---200--->|
          connection 2

                Figure 3: Multiple connections for requests

   Setting up a second connection (from B to A above) for subsequent
   requests, even requests in the context of an existing dialog (e.g.,
   re-INVITE request or BYE request after an initial INVITE request, or
   a NOTIFY request after a SUBSCRIBE request or a REFER request), can
   also cause excessive delay (especially in networks with long round-
   trip times).  Thus, it is advantageous to reuse connections whenever
   possible.

   From the user expectation point of view, it is advantageous if the
   re-INVITE requests or UPDATE requests are handled automatically and
   rapidly in order to avoid media and session state from being out of
   step.  If a re-INVITE request requires a new TLS connection, the re-
   INVITE request could be delayed by several extra round-trip times.
   Depending on the round-trip time, this combined delay could be
   perceptible or even annoying to a human user.  This is especially
   problematic for some common SIP call flows (for example, the
   recommended example flow in Figure 4 in RFC 3725 [RFC3725] uses many
   re-INVITE requests).

   The mechanism described in this document can mitigate the delays
   associated with subsequent requests.

5.  Overview of Operation

   This section is tutorial in nature, and does not specify any
   normative behavior.








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   We now explain this working in more detail in the context of
   communication between two adjacent proxies.  Without any loss of
   generality, the same technique can be used for connection reuse
   between a User Agent Client (UAC) and an edge proxy, or between an
   edge proxy and a UAS, or between an UAC and an UAS.

   P1 and P2 are proxies responsible for routing SIP requests to user
   agents that use them as edge proxies (see Figure 4).

                   P1 <===================> P2
              p1.example.com          p2.example.net
               (192.0.2.1)              (192.0.2.128)

        +---+                                    +---+
        |   |   0---0                   0---0    |   |
        |___|    /-\                     /-\     |___|
       /    /   +---+                   +---+   /    /
      +----+                                   +----+
      User Agents                       User Agents
      example.com domain                example.net domain

                           Figure 4: Proxy setup

   For illustration purpose the discussion below uses TCP as a transport
   for TLS operations.  Another streaming transport -- such as SCTP --
   can be used as well.

   The act of reusing a connection is initiated by P1 when it adds an
   "alias" header field parameter (defined later) to the Via header
   field.  When P2 receives the request, it examines the topmost Via
   header field.  If the Via header contained an "alias" header field
   parameter, P2 establishes a binding such that subsequent requests
   going to P1 will reuse the connection; i.e., requests are sent over
   the established connection.

   With reference to Figure 4, in order for P2 to reuse a connection for
   requests in the backwards direction, it is important that the
   validation model for requests sent in this direction (i.e., P2 to P1)
   is equivalent to the normal "connection in each direction" model,
   wherein P2 acting as client would open up a new connection in the
   backwards direction and validate the connection by examining the
   X.509 certificate presented.  The act of reusing a connection needs
   the desired property that requests get delivered in the backwards
   direction only if they would have been delivered to the same
   destination had connection reuse not been employed.  To guarantee
   this property, the X.509 certificate presented by P1 to P2 when a TLS
   connection is first authenticated are cached for later use.




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   To aid the discussion of connection reuse, this document defines a
   data structure called the connection alias table (or simply, alias
   table), which is used to store aliased addresses and is used by user
   agents to search for an existing connection before a new one is
   opened up to a destination.  It is not the intent of this memo to
   standardize the implementation of an alias table; rather, we use it
   as a convenience to aid subsequent discussions.

   P1 gets a request from one of its upstream user agents, and after
   performing RFC3263 [RFC3263] server selection, arrives at a resolved
   address of P2.  P1 maintains an alias table, and it populates the
   alias table with the IP address, port number, and transport of P2 as
   determined through RFC3263 server selection.  P1 adds an "alias"
   header field parameter to the topmost Via header field (inserted by
   it) before sending the request to P2.  The value in the sent-by
   production rule of the Via header field (including the port number),
   and the transport over which the request was sent becomes the
   advertised address of P1:

   Via: SIP/2.0/TLS p1.example.com;branch=z9hG4bKa7c8dze;alias

   Assuming that P1 does not already have an existing aliased connection
   with P2, P1 now opens a connection with P2.  P2 presents its X.509
   certificate to P1 for validation (see Section 9.1).  Upon connection
   authentication and acceptance, P1 adds P2 to its alias table.  P1's
   alias table now looks like:

   Destination  Destination  Destination  Destination      Alias
   IP Address   Port         Transport    Identity         Descriptor
   ...
   192.0.2.128  5061         TLS          sip:example.net     25
                                          sip:p2.example.net

   Subsequent requests that traverse from P1 to P2 will reuse this
   connection; i.e., the requests will be sent over the descriptor 25.

   The following columns in the alias table created at the client
   warrant an explanation:

   1.  The IP address, port, and transport are a result of executing the
       RFC3263 server resolution process on a next-hop URI.

   2.  The entries in the fourth column consists of the identities of
       the server as asserted in the X.509 certificate presented by the
       server.  These identities are cached by the client after the
       server has been duly authenticated (see Section 9.1).





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   3.  The entry in the last column is the socket descriptor over which
       P1, acting as a client, actively opened a TLS connection.  At
       some later time, when P1 gets a request from one of the user
       agents in its domain, it will reuse the aliased connection
       accessible through socket descriptor 25 if and only if all of the
       following conditions hold:

       A.  P1 determines through the RFC3263 server resolution process
           that the {transport, IP-address, port} tuple of P2 to be
           {TLS, 192.0.2.128, 5061}, and

       B.  The URI used for the RFC3263 server resolution matches one of
           the identities stored in the cached certificate (fourth
           column).

   When P2 receives the request, it examines the topmost Via header
   field to determine whether P1 is willing to use this connection as an
   aliased connection (i.e., accept requests from P2 towards P1).  The
   Via header field at P2 now looks like the following (the "received"
   header field parameter is added by P2):

   Via: SIP/2.0/TLS p1.example.com;branch=z9hG4bKa7c8dze;alias;
     received=192.0.2.1

   The presence of the "alias" Via header field parameter indicates that
   P1 supports aliasing on this connection.  P2 now authenticates the
   connection (see Section 9.2) and if the authentication was
   successful, P2 creates an alias to P1 using the advertised address in
   the topmost Via header field.  P2's alias table looks like the
   following:

   Destination  Destination  Destination  Destination     Alias
   IP Address   Port         Transport    Identity        Descriptor
   ...
   192.0.2.1    5061             TLS      sip:example.com     18
                                          sip:p1.example.com

   There are a few items of interest here:

   1.  The IP address field is populated with the source address of the
       client.

   2.  The port field is populated from the advertised address (topmost
       Via header field), if a port is present in it, or 5061 if it is
       not.






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   3.  The transport field is populated from the advertised address
       (topmost Via header field).

   4.  The entries in the fourth column consist of the identities of the
       client as asserted in the X.509 certificate presented by the
       client.  These identities are cached by the server after the
       client has been duly authenticated (see Section 9.2).

   5.  The entry in the last column is the socket descriptor over which
       the connection was passively accepted.  At some later time, when
       P2 gets a request from one of the user agents in its domain, it
       will reuse the aliased connection accessible through socket
       descriptor 18 if and only if all of the following conditions
       hold:

       A.  P2 determines through RFC3263 server resolution process that
           the {transport, IP-address, port} tuple of P1 to be {TLS,
           192.0.2.1, 5061}, and

       B.  The URI used for RFC3263 server resolution matches one of the
           identities stored in the cached certificate (fourth column).

   6.  The network address inserted in the "Destination IP Address"
       column is the source address as seen by P2 (i.e., the "received"
       header field parameter).  It could be the case that the host name
       of P1 resolves to different IP addresses due to round-robin DNS.
       However, the aliased connection is to be established with the
       original sender of the request.

6.  Requirements

   The following are the requirements that motivated this specification:

   1.  A connection sharing mechanism should allow SIP entities to reuse
       existing connections for requests and responses originated from
       either peer in the connection.

   2.  A connection sharing mechanism must not require clients to send
       all traffic from well-know SIP ports.

   3.  A connection sharing mechanism must not require configuring
       ephemeral port numbers in DNS.

   4.  A connection sharing mechanism must prevent unauthorized
       hijacking of other connections.

   5.  Connection sharing should persist across SIP transactions and
       dialogs.



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   6.  Connection sharing must work across name-based virtual SIP
       servers.

   7.  There is no requirement to share a complete path for ordinary
       connection reuse.  Hop-by-hop connection sharing is more
       appropriate.

7.  Formal Syntax

   The following syntax specification uses the augmented Backus-Naur
   Form (BNF) as described in RFC 5234 [RFC5234].  This document extends
   the via-params to include a new via-alias defined below.

      via-params =/ via-alias
      via-alias  =  "alias"

8.  Normative Behavior

8.1.  Client Behavior

   Clients SHOULD keep connections up as long as they are needed.
   Connection reuse works best when the client and the server maintain
   their connections for long periods of time.  Clients, therefore,
   SHOULD NOT automatically drop connections on completion of a
   transaction or termination of a dialog.

   The mechanism for connection reuse uses a new Via header field
   parameter.  The "alias" header field parameter is included in a Via
   header field value to indicate that the client wants to create a
   transport layer alias.  The client places its advertised address in
   the Via header field value (in the sent-by production).

   If the client places an "alias" header field parameter in the topmost
   Via header of the request, the client SHOULD keep the connection open
   for as long as the resources on the host operating system allow it
   to, and that the client MUST accept requests over this connection --
   in addition to the default listening port -- from its downstream
   peer.  And furthermore, the client SHOULD reuse the connection when
   subsequent requests in the same or different transactions are
   destined to the same resolved address.

      Note that RFC 3261 states that a response arrives over the same
      connection that was opened for a request.








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   Whether or not to allow an aliased connection ultimately depends on
   the recipient of the request; i.e., the client does not get any
   confirmation that its downstream peer created the alias, or indeed
   that it even supports this specification.  Thus, clients MUST NOT
   assume that the acceptance of a request by a server automatically
   enables connection aliasing.  Clients MUST continue receiving
   requests on their default port.

   Clients MUST authenticate the connection before forming an alias;
   Section 9.1 discusses the authentication steps in more detail.  Once
   the server has been authenticated, the client MUST cache, in the
   alias table, the identity (or identities) of the server as determined
   in Section 7.1 of RFC 5922 [RFC5922].  The client MUST also populate
   the destination IP address, port, and transport of the server in the
   alias table; these fields are retrieved from executing RFC3263 server
   resolution process on the next-hop URI.  And finally, the client MUST
   populate the alias descriptor field with the connection handle (or
   identifier) used to connect to the server.

   Once the alias table has been updated with a resolved address, and
   the client wants to send a new request in the direction of the
   server, the client reuses the connection only if all of the following
   conditions hold:

   1.  The client uses the RFC3263 resolution on a URI and arrives at a
       resolved address contained in the alias table, and

   2.  The URI used for RFC3263 server resolution matches one of the
       identities stored in the alias table row corresponding to that
       resolved address.

   Clients MUST be prepared for the case that the connection no longer
   exists when they are ready to send a subsequent request over it.  In
   such a case, a new connection MUST be opened to the resolved address
   and the alias table updated accordingly.

   This behavior has an adverse side effect when a CANCEL request or an
   ACK request for a non-2xx response is sent downstream.  Normally,
   these would be sent over the same connection over which the INVITE
   request was sent.  However, if between the sending of the INVITE
   request and subsequent sending of the CANCEL request or ACK request
   to a non-2xx response, the connection was closed, then the client
   SHOULD open a new connection to the resolved address and send the
   CANCEL request or ACK request there instead.  The client MAY insert
   the newly opened connection into the alias table.






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8.2.  Server Behavior

   Servers SHOULD keep connections up unless they need to reclaim
   resources.  Connection reuse works best when the client and the
   server maintain their connections for long periods of time.  Servers,
   therefore, SHOULD NOT automatically drop connections on completion of
   a transaction or termination of a dialog.

   When a server receives a request over TLS whose topmost Via header
   field contains an "alias" header field parameter, it signifies that
   the upstream client will leave the connection open beyond the
   transaction and dialog lifetime, and that subsequent transactions and
   dialogs that are destined to a resolved address that matches the
   identifiers in the advertised address in the topmost Via header field
   can reuse this connection.

   Whether or not to use in the reverse direction a connection marked
   with the "alias" Via header field parameter ultimately depends on the
   policies of the server.  It can choose to honor it, and thereby send
   subsequent requests over the aliased connection.  If the server
   chooses not to honor an aliased connection, the server MUST allow the
   request to proceed as though the "alias" header field parameter was
   not present in the topmost Via header.

      This assures interoperability with RFC3261 server behavior.
      Clients can include the "alias" header field parameter without
      fear that the server will reject the SIP request because of its
      presence.

   Servers MUST be prepared to deal with the case that the aliased
   connection no longer exist when they are ready to send a subsequent
   request over it.  This can happen if the peer ran out of operating
   system resources and had to close the connection.  In such a case,
   the server MUST open a new connection to the resolved address and the
   alias table updated accordingly.

   If the sent-by production of the Via header field contains a port,
   the server MUST use it as a destination port.  Otherwise, the default
   port is the destination port.

   Servers MUST follow the authentication steps outlined in Section 9.2
   to authenticate the connection before forming an alias.

   The server, if it decides to reuse the connection, MUST cache in the
   alias table the identity (or identities) of the client as they appear
   in the X.509 certificate subjectAlternativeName extension field.  The
   server also populates the destination IP address, port, and transport
   in the alias table from the topmost Via header field (using the



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   ";received" parameter for the destination IP address).  If the port
   number is omitted, a default port number of 5061 is to be used.  And
   finally, the server populates the alias descriptor field with the
   connection handle (or identifier) used to accept the connection from
   the client (see Section 5 for the contents of the alias table).

   Once the alias table has been updated, and the server wants to send a
   request in the direction of the client, it reuses the connection only
   if all of the following conditions hold:

   1.  The server, which acts as a client for this transaction, uses the
       RFC3263 resolution process on a URI and arrives at a resolved
       address contained in the alias table, and

   2.  The URI used for RFC3263 server resolution matches one of the
       identities stored in the alias table row corresponding to that
       resolved address.

8.3.  Closing a TLS connection

   Either the client or the server may terminate a TLS session by
   sending a TLS closure alert.  Before closing a TLS connection, the
   initiator of the closure MUST either wait for any outstanding SIP
   transactions to complete, or explicitly abandon them.

   After the initiator of the close has sent a closure alert, it MUST
   discard any TLS messages until it has received a similar alert from
   its peer.  The receiver of the closure alert MUST NOT start any new
   SIP transactions after the receipt of the closure alert.

9.  Security Considerations

   This document presents requirements and a mechanism for reusing
   existing connections easily.  Unauthenticated connection reuse would
   present many opportunities for rampant abuse and hijacking.
   Authenticating connection aliases is essential to prevent connection
   hijacking.  For example, a program run by a malicious user of a
   multiuser system could attempt to hijack SIP requests destined for
   the well-known SIP port from a large relay proxy.

9.1.  Authenticating TLS Connections: Client View

   When a TLS client establishes a connection with a server, it is
   presented with the server's X.509 certificate.  Authentication
   proceeds as described in Section 7.3 ("Client behavior") of RFC 5922
   [RFC5922].





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9.2.  Authenticating TLS Connections: Server View

   A TLS server conformant to this specification MUST ask for a client
   certificate; if the client possesses a certificate, it will be
   presented to the server for mutual authentication, and authentication
   proceeds as described in Section 7.4 ("Server behavior") of RFC 5922
   [RFC5922].

   If the client does not present a certificate, the server MUST proceed
   as if the "alias" header field parameter was not present in the
   topmost Via header.  In this case, the server MUST NOT update the
   alias table.

9.3.  Connection Reuse and Virtual Servers

   Virtual servers present special considerations for connection reuse.
   Under the name-based virtual server scheme, one SIP proxy can host
   many virtual domains using one IP address and port number.  If
   adequate defenses are not put in place, a connection opened to a
   downstream server on behalf of one domain can be reused to send
   requests in the backwards direction to a different domain.  The
   "Destination Identity" column in the alias table has been added to
   aid in such defenses.

   Virtual servers MUST only perform connection reuse for TLS
   connections; virtual servers MUST NOT perform connection reuse for
   other connection-oriented transports.  To understand why this is the
   case, note that the alias table caches not only which connections go
   to which destination addresses, but also which connections have
   authenticated themselves as responsible for which domains.  If a
   message is to be sent in the backwards direction to a new SIP domain
   that resolves to an address with a cached connection, the cached
   connection cannot be used because it is not authenticated for the new
   domain.

   As an example, consider a proxy P1 that hosts two virtual domains --
   example.com and example.net -- on the same IP address and port.
   RFC3263 server resolution is set up such that a DNS lookup of
   example.com and example.net both resolve to an {IP-address, port,
   transport} tuple of {192.0.2.1, 5061, TLS}.  A user agent in the
   example.com domain sends a request to P1 causing it to make a
   downstream connection to its peering proxy, P2, and authenticating
   itself as a proxy in the example.com domain by sending it a X.509
   certificate asserting such an identity.  P2's alias table now looks
   like the following:






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   Destination  Destination  Destination  Destination     Alias
   IP Address   Port         Transport    Identity        Descriptor
   ...
   192.0.2.1    5061             TLS      sip:example.com     18

   At some later point in time, a user agent in P2's domain wants to
   send a request to a user agent in the example.net domain.  P2
   performs an RFC3263 server resolution process on sips:example.net to
   derive a resolved address tuple {192.0.2.1, 5061, TLS}.  It appears
   that a connection to this network address is already cached in the
   alias table; however, P2 cannot reuse this connection because the
   destination identity (sip:example.com) does not match the server
   identity used for RFC3261 resolution (sips:example.net).  Hence, P2
   will open up a new connection to the example.net virtual domain
   hosted on P1.  P2's alias table will now look like:

   Destination  Destination  Destination  Destination     Alias
   IP Address   Port         Transport    Identity        Descriptor
   ...
   192.0.2.1    5061             TLS      sip:example.com     18
   192.0.2.1    5061             TLS      sip:example.net     54

   The identities conveyed in an X.509 certificate are associated with a
   specific TLS connection.  Absent such a guarantee of an identity tied
   to a specific connection, a normal TCP or SCTP connection cannot be
   used to send requests in the backwards direction without a
   significant risk of inadvertent (or otherwise) connection hijacking.

   The above discussion details the impact on P2 when connection reuse
   is desired for virtual servers.  There is a subtle, but important
   impact on P1 as well.

   P1 should keep separate alias tables for the requests served from the
   UAs in the example.com domain from those served by the UAs in the
   example.net domain.  This is so that the boundary between the two
   domains is preserved; P1 MUST NOT open a connection on behalf of one
   domain and reuse it to send a new request on behalf of another
   domain.













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10.  Connection Reuse and SRV Interaction

   Connection reuse has an interaction with the DNS SRV load balancing
   mechanism.  To understand the interaction, consider the following
   figure:

             /+---- S1
   +-------+/
   | Proxy |------- S2
   +-------+\
             \+---- S3

                         Figure 5: Load balancing

   Here, the proxy uses the DNS SRV to load balance across the three
   servers, S1, S2, and S3.  Using the connect reuse mechanism specified
   in this document, over time the proxy will maintain a distinct
   aliased connection to each of the servers.  However, once this is
   done, subsequent traffic is load balanced across the three downstream
   servers in the normal manner.

11.  IANA Considerations

   This specification defines a new Via header field parameter called
   "alias" in the "Header Field Parameters and Parameter Values" sub-
   registry as per the registry created by RFC 3968 [RFC3968].  The
   required information is:

   Header Field  Parameter Name  Predefined Values  Reference
   ___________________________________________________________________
   Via           alias                 No           RFC5923

12.  Acknowledgments

   Thanks to Jon Peterson for helpful answers about certificate behavior
   with SIP, Jonathan Rosenberg for his initial support of this concept,
   and Cullen Jennings for providing a sounding board for this idea.
   Other members of the SIP WG that contributed to this document include
   Jeroen van Bemmel, Keith Drage, Matthew Gardiner, Rajnish Jain, Benny
   Prijono, and Rocky Wang.

   Dale Worley and Hadriel Kaplan graciously performed a WGLC review of
   the document.  The resulting revision has benefited tremendously from
   their feedback.







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13.  References

13.1.  Normative References

   [RFC3261]  Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston,
              A., Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E.
              Schooler, "SIP: Session Initiation Protocol", RFC 3261,
              June 2002.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC5246]  Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
              (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008.

   [RFC3263]  Rosenberg, J. and H. Schulzrinne, "Session Initiation
              Protocol (SIP): Locating SIP Servers", RFC 3263,
              June 2002.

   [RFC5234]  Crocker, D. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax
              Specifications: ABNF", RFC 5234, January 2008.

   [RFC5922]  Gurbani, V., Lawrence, S., and B. Laboratories, "Domain
              Certificates in the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)",
              RFC 5922, June 2010.

13.2.  Informative References

   [RFC3968]  Camarillo, G., "The Internet Assigned Number Authority
              (IANA) Header Field Parameter Registry for the Session
              Initiation Protocol (SIP)", BCP 98, RFC 3968,
              December 2004.

   [RFC5626]  Jennings, C., Mahy, R., and F. Audet, "Managing Client-
              Initiated Connections in the Session Initiation Protocol
              (SIP)", RFC 5626, October 2009.

   [Book-Rescorla-TLS]
              Rescorla, E., "SSL and TLS: Designing and Building Secure
              Systems", Addison-Wesley Publishing, 2001.

   [RFC3725]  Rosenberg, J., Peterson, J., Schulzrinne, H., and G.
              Camarillo, "Best Current Practices for Third Party Call
              Control (3pcc) in the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)",
              BCP 85, RFC 3725, April 2004.

   [RFC4960]  Stewart, R., "Stream Control Transmission Protocol",
              RFC 4960, September 2007.



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Authors' Addresses

   Vijay K. Gurbani (editor)
   Bell Laboratories, Alcatel-Lucent

   EMail: vkg@alcatel-lucent.com


   Rohan Mahy
   Unaffiliated

   EMail: rohan@ekabal.com


   Brett Tate
   BroadSoft

   EMail: brett@broadsoft.com

































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