





Network Working Group                                   R. Bradford, Ed.
Request for Comments: 5520                                   JP. Vasseur
Category: Standards Track                            Cisco Systems, Inc.
                                                               A. Farrel
                                                      Old Dog Consulting
                                                              April 2009


                Preserving Topology Confidentiality in
     Inter-Domain Path Computation Using a Path-Key-Based Mechanism

Status of This Memo

   This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the
   Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for
   improvements.  Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet
   Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state
   and status of this protocol.  Distribution of this memo is unlimited.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2009 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents in effect on the date of
   publication of this document (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
   and restrictions with respect to this document.

Abstract

   Multiprotocol Label Switching (MPLS) and Generalized MPLS (GMPLS)
   Traffic Engineering (TE) Label Switched Paths (LSPs) may be computed
   by Path Computation Elements (PCEs).  Where the TE LSP crosses
   multiple domains, such as Autonomous Systems (ASes), the path may be
   computed by multiple PCEs that cooperate, with each responsible for
   computing a segment of the path.  However, in some cases (e.g., when
   ASes are administered by separate Service Providers), it would break
   confidentiality rules for a PCE to supply a path segment to a PCE in
   another domain, thus disclosing AS-internal topology information.
   This issue may be circumvented by returning a loose hop and by
   invoking a new path computation from the domain boundary Label
   Switching Router (LSR) during TE LSP setup as the signaling message
   enters the second domain, but this technique has several issues
   including the problem of maintaining path diversity.





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   This document defines a mechanism to hide the contents of a segment
   of a path, called the Confidential Path Segment (CPS).  The CPS may
   be replaced by a path-key that can be conveyed in the PCE
   Communication Protocol (PCEP) and signaled within in a Resource
   Reservation Protocol TE (RSVP-TE) explicit route object.

Table of contents

   1. Introduction ....................................................3
      1.1. Terminology ................................................4
   2. Path-Key Solution ...............................................5
      2.1. Mode of Operation ..........................................5
      2.2. Example ....................................................6
   3. PCEP Protocol Extensions ........................................7
      3.1. Path-Keys in PCRep Messages ................................7
           3.1.1. PKS with 32-Bit PCE ID ..............................8
           3.1.2. PKS with 128-Bit PCE ID .............................9
      3.2. Unlocking Path-Keys .......................................10
           3.2.1. Path-Key Bit .......................................10
           3.2.2. PATH-KEY Object ....................................10
           3.2.3. Path Computation Request (PCReq) Message
                  with Path-Key ......................................11
   4. PCEP Mode of Operation for Path-Key Expansion ..................12
   5. Security Considerations ........................................12
   6. Manageability Considerations ...................................13
      6.1. Control of Function through Configuration and Policy ......13
      6.2. Information and Data Models ...............................14
      6.3. Liveness Detection and Monitoring .........................15
      6.4. Verifying Correct Operation ...............................15
      6.5. Requirements on Other Protocols and Functional
           Components ................................................15
      6.6. Impact on Network Operation ...............................16
   7. IANA Considerations ............................................16
      7.1. New Subobjects for the ERO Object .........................16
      7.2. New PCEP Object ...........................................17
      7.3. New RP Object Bit Flag ....................................17
      7.4. New NO-PATH-VECTOR TLV Bit Flag ...........................17
   8. References .....................................................17
      8.1. Normative References ......................................17
      8.2. Informative References ....................................18
   Acknowledgements ..................................................19










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1.  Introduction

   Path computation techniques using the Path Computation Element (PCE)
   are described in [RFC4655] and allow for path computation of inter-
   domain Multiprotocol Label Switching (MPLS) Traffic Engineering (TE)
   and Generalized MPLS (GMPLS) Label Switched Paths (LSPs).

   An important element of inter-domain TE is that TE information is not
   shared between domains for scalability and confidentiality reasons
   ([RFC4105] and [RFC4216]).  Therefore, a single PCE is unlikely to be
   able to compute a full inter-domain path.

   Two path computation scenarios can be used for inter-domain TE LSPs:
   one using per-domain path computation (defined in [RFC5152]), and the
   other using a PCE-based path computation technique with cooperation
   between PCEs (as described in [RFC4655]).  In this second case, paths
   for inter-domain LSPs can be computed by cooperation between PCEs
   each of which computes a segment of the path across one domain.  Such
   a path computation procedure is described in [RFC5441].

   If confidentiality is required between domains (such as would very
   likely be the case between Autonomous Systems (ASes) belonging to
   different Service Providers), then cooperating PCEs cannot exchange
   path segments or else the receiving PCE and the Path Computation
   Client (PCC) will be able to see the individual hops through another
   domain thus breaking the confidentiality requirement stated in
   [RFC4105] and [RFC4216].  We define the part of the path that we wish
   to keep confidential as the Confidential Path Segment (CPS).

   One mechanism for preserving the confidentiality of the CPS is for
   the PCE to return a path containing a loose hop in place of the
   segment that must be kept confidential.  The concept of loose and
   strict hops for the route of a TE LSP is described in [RFC3209].  The
   Path Computation Element Communication Protocol (PCEP) defined in
   [RFC5440] supports the use of paths with loose hops, and it is a
   local policy decision at a PCE whether it returns a full explicit
   path with strict hops or uses loose hops.  Note that a path
   computation request may request an explicit path with strict hops or
   may allow loose hops as detailed in [RFC5440].

   The option of returning a loose hop in place of the CPS can be
   achieved without further extensions to PCEP or the signaling
   protocol.  If loose hops are used, the TE LSPs are signaled as normal
   ([RFC3209]), and when a loose hop is encountered in the explicit
   route, it is resolved by performing a secondary path computation to
   reach the resource or set of resources identified by the loose hop.
   Given the nature of the cooperation between PCEs in computing the
   original path, this secondary computation occurs at or on behalf of a



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   Label Switching Router (LSR) at a domain boundary (i.e., an Area
   Border Router (ABR) or an AS Border Router (ASBR)) and the path is
   expanded as described in [RFC5152].

   The PCE-based computation model is particularly useful for
   determining mutually disjoint inter-domain paths such as might be
   required for service protection [RFC5298].  A single path computation
   request is used.  However, if loose hops are returned, the path of
   each TE LSP must be recomputed at the domain boundaries as the TE
   LSPs are signaled, and since the TE LSP signaling proceeds
   independently for each TE LSP, disjoint paths cannot be guaranteed
   since the LSRs in charge of expanding the explicit route objects
   (EROs) are not synchronized.  Therefore, if the loose hop technique
   is used without further extensions, path segment confidentiality and
   path diversity are mutually incompatible requirements.

   This document defines the notion of a Path-Key that is a token that
   replaces a path segment in an explicit route.  The Path-Key is
   encoded as a Path-Key Subobject (PKS) returned in the PCEP Path
   Computation Reply message (PCRep) ([RFC5440]).  Upon receiving the
   computed path, the PKS will be carried in an RSVP-TE Path message
   (RSVP-TE [RFC3209] and [RSVP-PKS]) during signaling.

   The BNF in this document follows the format described in [RBNF].

   Please note that the term "path-key" used in this document refers to
   an identifier allocated by a PCE to represent a segment of a computed
   path.  This term has no relation to the term "cryptographic key" used
   in some documents that describe security mechanisms.

1.1.  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED",  "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

   This document makes use of the following terminology and acronyms.

   AS: Autonomous System.

   ASBR: Autonomous System Border Routers used to connect to another AS
   of a different or the same Service Provider via one or more links
   inter-connecting between ASes.

   CPS: Confidential Path Segment.  A segment of a path that contains
   nodes and links that the AS policy requires to not be disclosed
   outside the AS.




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   Inter-AS TE LSP: A TE LSP that crosses an AS boundary.

   LSR: Label Switching Router.

   LSP: Label Switched Path.

   PCC: Path Computation Client: Any client application requesting a
   path computation to be performed by a Path Computation Element.

   PCE: Path Computation Element: An entity (component, application or
   network node) that is capable of computing a network path or route
   based on a network graph and applying computational constraints.

   TE LSP: Traffic Engineering Label Switched Path.

2.  Path-Key Solution

   The Path-Key solution may be applied in the PCE-based path
   computation context as follows.  A PCE computes a path segment
   related to a particular domain and replaces any CPS in the path
   reported to the requesting PCC (or another PCE) by one or more
   subobjects referred to as PKSes.  The entry boundary LSR of each CPS
   SHOULD be specified using its TE Router Id as a hop in the returned
   path immediately preceding the CPS, and other subobjects MAY be
   included in the path immediately before the hop identifying the
   boundary LSR to indicate link and label choices.  Where two PKSes are
   supplied in sequence with no intervening nodes, the entry node to the
   second CPS MAY be part of the first CPS and does not need to be
   explicitly present in the returned path.  The exit node of a CPS MAY
   be present as a strict hop immediately following the PKS.

2.1.  Mode of Operation

   During path computation, when local policy dictates that
   confidentiality must be preserved for all or part of the path segment
   being computed or if explicitly requested by the path computation
   request, the PCE associates a path-key with the computed path for the
   CPS, places its own identifier (its PCE ID as defined in Section 3.1)
   along with the path-key in a PKS, and inserts the PKS object in the
   path returned to the requesting PCC or PCE immediately after the
   subobject that identifies (using the TE Router Id) the LSR that will
   expand the PKS into explicit path hops.  This will usually be the LSR
   that is the starting point of the CPS.  The PCE that generates a PKS
   SHOULD store the computed path segment and the path-key for later
   retrieval.  A local policy SHOULD be used to determine for how long
   to retain such stored





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   information, and whether to discard the information after it has been
   queried using the procedures described below.  It is RECOMMENDED for
   a PCE to store the PKS for a period of 10 minutes.

   A path-key value is scoped to the PCE that computed it as identified
   by the PCE-ID carried in the PKS.  A PCE MUST NOT re-use a path-key
   value to represent a new CPS for at least 30 minutes after discarding
   the previous use of the same path-key.  A PCE that is unable to
   retain information about previously used path-key values over a
   restart SHOULD use some other mechanism to guarantee uniqueness of
   path-key values such as embedding a timestamp or version number in
   the path-key.

   A head-end LSR that is a PCC converts the path returned by a PCE into
   an explicit route object (ERO) that it includes in the Resource
   Reservation Protocol (RSVP) Path message.  If the path returned by
   the PCE contains a PKS, this is included in the ERO.  Like any other
   subobjects, the PKS is passed transparently from hop to hop, until it
   becomes the first subobject in the ERO.  This will occur at the start
   of the CPS, which will usually be the domain boundary.  The PKS MUST
   be preceded by an ERO subobject that identifies the LSR that must
   expand the PKS.  This means that (following the rules for ERO
   processing set out in [RFC3209]) the PKS will not be encountered in
   ERO processing until the ERO is being processed by the LSR that is
   capable of correctly handling the PKS.

   An LSR that encounters a PKS when trying to identify the next hop
   retrieves the PCE-ID from the PKS and sends a Path Computation
   Request (PCReq) message as defined in [RFC5440] to the PCE identified
   by the PCE-ID that contains the path-key object .

   Upon receiving the PCReq message, the PCE identifies the computed
   path segment using the supplied path-key, and returns the previously
   computed path segment in the form of explicit hops using an ERO
   object contained in the Path Computation Reply (PCRep) to the
   requesting node as defined in [RFC5440].  The requesting node inserts
   the explicit hops into the ERO and continues to process the TE LSP
   setup as per [RFC3209].

2.2.  Example

   Figure 1 shows a simple two-AS topology with a PCE responsible for
   the path computations in each AS.  An LSP is requested from the
   ingress LSR in one AS to the egress LSR in the other AS.  The
   ingress, acting as the PCC, sends a path computation request to
   PCE-1.  PCE-1 is unable to compute an end-to-end path and invokes
   PCE-2 (possibly using the techniques described in [RFC5441]).  PCE-2
   computes a path segment from ASBR-2 to the egress as {ASBR-2, C, D,



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   Egress}.  It could pass this path segment back to PCE-1 in full, or
   it could send back the path {ASBR-2, Egress} where the second hop is
   a loose hop.

   However, in order to protect the confidentiality of the topology in
   the second AS while still specifying the path in full, PCE-2 may send
   PCE-1 a path segment expressed as {ASBR-2, PKS, Egress} where the PKS
   is a Path-Key Subobject as defined in this document.  In this case,
   PCE-2 has identified the segment {ASBR-2, C, D, Egress} as a
   Confidential Path Segment (CPS).  PCE-1 will compute the path segment
   that it is responsible for, and will supply the full path to the PCC
   as {Ingress, A, B, ASBR-1, ASBR-2, PKS, Egress}.

   Signaling proceeds in the first AS as normal, but when the Path
   message reaches ASBR-2, the next hop is the PKS, and this must be
   expanded before signaling can progress further.  ASBR-2 uses the
   information in the PKS to request PCE-2 for a path segment, and PCE-2
   will return the segment {ASBR-2, C, D, Egress} allowing signaling to
   continue to set up the LSP.

       -----------------------------    ----------------------------
      |     -------                 |  |    -------                 |
      |    | PCE-1 |<---------------+--+-->| PCE-2 |                |
      |     -------                 |  |    -------                 |
      |      ^                      |  |    ^                       |
      |      |                      |  |    |                       |
      |      v                      |  |    v                       |
      |  -------              ----  |  |  ----                      |
      | |  PCC  |   -    -   |ASBR| |  | |ASBR|   -    -    ------  |
      | |Ingress|--|A|--|B|--|  1 |-+--+-|  2 |--|C|--|D|--|Egress| |
      |  -------    -    -    ----- |  |  ----    -    -    ------  |
      |                             |  |                            |
       -----------------------------    ----------------------------

        Figure 1 : A Simple network to demonstrate the use of the PKS

3.  PCEP Protocol Extensions

3.1.  Path-Keys in PCRep Messages

   Path-Keys are carried in PCReq and PCRep messages as part of the
   various objects that carry path definitions.  In particular, a Path-
   Key is carried in the Explicit Route Object (ERO) on PCRep messages.

   In all cases, the Path-Key is carried in a Path-Key Subobject (PKS).






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   The PKS is a fixed-length subobject containing a Path-Key and a
   PCE-ID.  The Path-Key is an identifier, or token used to represent
   the CPS within the context of the PCE identified by the PCE-ID.  The
   PCE-ID identifies the PCE that can decode the Path-Key using an
   identifier that is unique within the domain that the PCE serves.  The
   PCE-ID has to be mapped to a reachable IPv4 or IPv6 address of the
   PCE by the first node of the CPS (usually a domain border router) and
   a PCE MAY use one of its reachable IP addresses as its PCE-ID.
   Alternatively and to provide greater security (see Section 5) or
   increased confidentiality, according to domain-local policy, the PCE
   MAY use some other identifier that is scoped only within the domain.

   To allow IPv4 and IPv6 addresses to be carried, two subobjects are
   defined in the following subsections.

   The Path-Key Subobject may be present in the PCEP ERO or the PCEP
   PATH-KEY object (see Section 3.2).

3.1.1.  PKS with 32-Bit PCE ID

   The Subobject Type for the PKS with 32-bit PCE ID is 64.  The format
   of this subobject is as follows:

     0                   1                   2                   3
     0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    |L|    Type     |     Length    |           Path-Key            |
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    |                         PCE ID (4 bytes)                      |
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

      L

         The L bit SHOULD NOT be set, so that the subobject represents a
         strict hop in the explicit route.

      Type

         Subobject Type for a Path-Key with 32-bit PCE ID (64).

      Length

         The Length contains the total length of the subobject in bytes,
         including the Type and Length fields.  The Length is always 8.







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      PCE ID

         A 32-bit identifier of the PCE that can decode this path-key.
         The identifier MUST be unique within the scope of the domain
         that the CPS crosses, and MUST be understood by the LSR that
         will act as PCC for the expansion of the PKS.  The
         interpretation of the PCE-ID is subject to domain-local policy.
         It MAY be an IPv4 address of the PCE that is always reachable,
         and MAY be an address that is restricted to the domain in which
         the LSR that is called upon to expand the CPS lies.  Other
         values that have no meaning outside the domain (for example,
         the Router ID of the PCE) MAY be used to increase security or
         confidentiality (see Section 5).

3.1.2.  PKS with 128-Bit PCE ID

   The Subobject Type for the PKS with 128-bit PCE ID is 65.  The format
   of the subobject is as follows.

    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |L|    Type     |     Length    |           Path-Key            |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                        PCE ID (16 bytes)                      |
   |                                                               |
   |                                                               |
   |                                                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

      L

         As above.

      Type

         Subobject Type for a Path-Key with 128-bit PCE ID (65).

      Length

         The Length contains the total length of the subobject in bytes,
         including the Type and Length fields.  The Length is always 20.

      PCE ID

         A 128-bit identifier of the PCE that can decode this path-key.
         The identifier MUST be unique within the scope of the domain
         that the CPS crosses, and MUST be understood by the LSR that



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         will act as PCC for the expansion of the PKS.  The
         interpretation of the PCE-ID is subject to domain-local policy.
         It MAY be an IPv6 address of the PCE that is always reachable,
         but MAY be an address that is restricted to the domain in which
         the LSR that is called upon to expand the CPS lies.  Other
         values that have no meaning outside the domain (for example,
         the IPv6 TE Router ID) MAY be used to increase security (see
         Section 5).

3.2.  Unlocking Path-Keys

   When a network node needs to decode a Path-Key so that it can
   continue signaling for an LSP, it must send a PCReq to the designated
   PCE.  The PCReq defined in [RFC5440] needs to be modified to support
   this usage, which differs from the normal path computation request.
   To that end, a new flag is defined to show that the PCReq relates to
   the expansion of a PKS, and a new object is defined to carry the PKS
   in the PCReq.  These result in an update to the BNF for the message.
   The BNF used in this document is as described in [RBNF].

3.2.1.  Path-Key Bit

   [RFC5440] defines the Request Parameters (RP) object that is used to
   specify various characteristics of the Path Computation Request
   (PCReq).

   In this document, we define a new bit named the Path-Key bit as
   follows.  See Section 7.3 for the IANA assignment of the appropriate
   bit number.

   Path-Key bit: When set, the requesting PCC requires the retrieval of
   a Confidential Path Segment that corresponds to the PKS carried in a
   PATH-KEY object in the path computation request.  The Path-Key bit
   MUST be cleared when the path computation request is not related to a
   CPS retrieval.

3.2.2.  PATH-KEY Object

   When a PCC needs to expand a path-key in order to expand a CPS, it
   issues a Path Computation Request (PCReq) to the PCE identified in
   the PKS in the RSVP-TE ERO that it is processing.  The PCC supplies
   the PKS to be expanded in a PATH-KEY Object in the PCReq message.









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   The PATH-KEY Object is defined as follows:

   PATH-KEY Object-Class is 16.

   Path-Key Object-Type is 1.

   The PATH-KEY Object MUST contain at least one Path-Key Subobject (see
   Section 3.1).  The first PKS MUST be processed by the PCE.
   Subsequent subobjects SHOULD be ignored.

3.2.3.  Path Computation Request (PCReq) Message with Path-Key

   The format of a PCReq message including a PATH-KEY object is
   unchanged as follows:

       <PCReq Message>::= <Common Header>
                          [<SVEC-list>]
                          <request-list>

       where:
          <svec-list>::=<SVEC>[<svec-list>]
          <request-list>::=<request>[<request-list>]

   To support the use of the message to expand a PKS, the definition of
   <request> is modified as follows :

       <request>::= <RP>
                    <segment-computation> | <path-key-expansion>

       where:
          <segment-computation> ::= <END-POINTS>
                                    [<LSPA>]
                                    [<BANDWIDTH>]
                                    [<BANDWIDTH>]
                                    [<metric-list>]
                                    [<RRO>]
                                    [<IRO>]
                                    [<LOAD-BALANCING>]
          <path-key-expansion> ::= <PATH-KEY>

   Thus, the format of the message for use in normal path computation is
   unmodified.









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4.  PCEP Mode of Operation for Path-Key Expansion

   The retrieval of the explicit path (the CPS) associated with a PKS by
   a PCC is no different than any other path computation request with
   the exception that the PCReq message MUST contain a PATH-KEY object
   and the Path-Key bit of the RP object MUST be set.  On receipt of a
   PCRep containing a CPS, the requesting PCC SHOULD insert the CPS into
   the ERO that it will signal, in accordance with local policy.

   If the receiving PCE does not recognize itself as identified by the
   PCE ID carried in the PKS, it MAY forward the PCReq message to
   another PCE according to local policy.  If the PCE does not forward
   such a PCReq, it MUST respond with a PCRep message containing a
   NO-PATH object.

   If the receiving PCE recognizes itself, but cannot find the related
   CPS, or if the retrieval of the CPS is not allowed by policy, the PCE
   MUST send a PCRep message that contains a NO-PATH object.  The
   NO-PATH-VECTOR TLV SHOULD be used as described in [RFC5440] and a new
   bit number (see Section 7.4) is assigned to indicate "Cannot expand
   PKS".

   Upon receipt of a negative reply, the requesting LSR MUST fail the
   LSP setup and SHOULD use the procedures associated with loose hop
   expansion failure [RFC3209].

5.  Security Considerations

   This document describes tunneling confidential path information
   across an untrusted domain (such as an AS).  There are many security
   considerations that apply to PCEP and RSVP-TE.

   Issues include:

   - Confidentiality of the CPS (can other network elements probe for
     expansion of path-keys, possibly at random?).

   - Authenticity of the path-key (resilience to alteration by
     intermediaries, resilience to fake expansion of path-keys).

   - Resilience from Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks (insertion of
     spurious path-keys; flooding of bogus path-key expansion requests).

   Most of the interactions required by this extension are point to
   point, can be authenticated and made secure as described in [RFC5440]
   and [RFC3209].  These interactions include the:





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       - PCC->PCE request

       - PCE->PCE request(s)

       - PCE->PCE response(s)

       - PCE->PCC response

       - LSR->LSR request and response.  Note that a rogue LSR could
         modify the ERO and insert or modify Path-Keys.  This would
         result in an LSR (which is downstream in the ERO) sending
         decode requests to a PCE.  This is actually a larger problem
         with RSVP.  The rogue LSR is an existing issue with RSVP and
         will not be addressed here.

       - LSR->PCE request.  Note that the PCE can check that the LSR
         requesting the decode is the LSR at the head of the Path-Key.
         This largely contains the previous problem of DoS rather than a
         security issue.  A rogue LSR can issue random decode requests,
         but these will amount only to DoS.

       - PCE->LSR response

   Thus, the major security issues can be dealt with using standard
   techniques for securing and authenticating point-to-point
   communications.  In addition, it is recommended that the PCE
   providing a decode response should check that the LSR that issued the
   decode request is the head end of the decoded ERO segment.

   Further protection can be provided by using a PCE ID to identify the
   decoding PCE that is only meaningful within the domain that contains
   the LSR at the head of the CPS.  This may be an IP address that is
   only reachable from within the domain, or some not-address value.
   The former requires configuration of policy on the PCEs, the latter
   requires domain-wide policy.

6.  Manageability Considerations

6.1.  Control of Function through Configuration and Policy

   The treatment of a path segment as a CPS, and its substitution in a
   PCRep ERO with a PKS, is a function that MUST be under operator and
   policy control where a PCE supports the function.  The operator MUST
   be given the ability to specify which path segments are to be
   replaced and under what circumstances.  For example, an operator
   might set a policy that states that every path segment for the
   operator's domain will be replaced by a PKS when the PCReq has been
   issued from outside the domain.



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   The operation of the PKS extensions require that path-keys are
   retained by the issuing PCE to be available for retrieval by an LSR
   (acting as a PCC) at a later date.  But it is possible that the
   retrieval request will never be made, so good housekeeping requires
   that a timer is run to discard unwanted path-keys.  A default value
   for this timer is suggested in Section 2.1.  Implementations SHOULD
   provide the ability for this value to be overridden through operator
   configuration or policy.

   After a PKS has been expanded in response to a retrieval request, it
   may be valuable to retain the path-key and CPS for debugging
   purposes.  Such retention SHOULD NOT be the default behavior of an
   implementation, but MAY be available in response to operator request.

   Once a path-key has been discarded, the path-key value SHOULD NOT be
   immediately available for re-use for a new CPS since this might lead
   to accidental misuse.  A default timer value is suggested in Section
   2.1.  Implementations SHOULD provide the ability for this value to be
   overridden through operator configuration or policy.

   A PCE must set a PCE-ID value in each PKS it creates so that PCCs can
   correctly identify it and send PCReq messages to expand the PKS to a
   path segment.  A PCE implementation SHOULD allow operator or policy
   control of the value to be used as the PCE-ID.  If the PCE allows
   PCE-ID values that are not routable addresses to be used, the PCCs
   MUST be configurable (by the operator or through policy) to allow the
   PCCs to map from the PCE-ID to a routable address of the PCE.  Such
   mapping may be algorithmic, procedural (for example, mapping a PCE-ID
   equal to the IGP Router ID into a routable address), or configured
   through a local or remote mapping table.

6.2.  Information and Data Models

   A MIB module for PCEP is already defined in [PCEP-MIB].  The
   configurable items listed in Section 6.1 MUST be added as readable
   objects in the module and SHOULD be added as writable objects.

   A new MIB module MUST be created to allow inspection of path-keys.
   For a given PCE, this MIB module MUST provide a mapping from path-
   key to path segment (that is, a list of hops), and MUST supply other
   information including:

   - The identity of the PCC that issued the original request that led
     to the creation of the path-key.

   - The request ID of the original PCReq.





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   - Whether the path-key has been retrieved yet, and if so, by which
     PCC.

   - How long until the path segment associated with the path-key will
     be discarded.

   - How long until the path-key will be available for re-use.

6.3.  Liveness Detection and Monitoring

   The procedures in this document extend PCEP, but do not introduce new
   interactions between network entities.  Thus, no new liveness
   detection or monitoring is required.

   It is possible that a head-end LSR that has be given a path including
   PKSs replacing specific CPSs will want to know whether the path-keys
   are still valid (or have timed out).  However, rather than introduce
   a mechanism to poll the PCE that is responsible for the PKS, it is
   considered pragmatic to simply signal the associated LSP.

6.4.  Verifying Correct Operation

   The procedures in this document extend PCEP, but do not introduce new
   interactions between network entities.  Thus, no new tools for
   verifying correct operation are required.

   A PCE SHOULD maintain counters and logs of the following events that
   might indicate incorrect operation (or might indicate security
   issues).

   - Attempts to expand an unknown path-key.

   - Attempts to expand an expired path-key.

   - Duplicate attempts to expand the same path-key.

   - Expiry of path-key without attempt to expand it.

6.5.  Requirements on Other Protocols and Functional Components

   The procedures described in this document require that the LSRs
   signal PKSs as defined in [RSVP-PKS].  Note that the only changes to
   LSRs are at the PCCs.  Specifically, changes are only needed at the
   head-end LSRs that build RSVP-TE Path messages containing Path-Key
   Subobjects in their EROs, and the LSRs that discover such subobjects
   as next hops and must expand them.  Other LSRs in the network, even
   if they are on the path of the LSP, will not be called upon to
   process the PKS.



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6.6.  Impact on Network Operation

   As well as the security and confidentiality aspects addressed by the
   use of the PKS, there may be some scaling benefits associated with
   the procedures described in this document.  For example, a single PKS
   in an explicit route may substitute for many subobjects and can
   reduce the overall message size correspondingly.  In some
   circumstances, such as when the explicit route contains multiple
   subobjects for each hop (including node IDs, TE link IDs, component
   link IDs for each direction of a bidirectional LSP, and label IDs for
   each direction of a bidirectional LSP) or when the LSP is a point-
   to-multipoint LSP, this scaling improvement may be very significant.

   Note that a PCE will not supply a PKS unless it knows that the LSR
   that will receive the PKS through signaling will be able to handle
   it.  Furthermore, as noted in Section 6.5, only those LSRs
   specifically called upon to expand the PKS will be required to
   process the subobjects during signaling.  Thus, the only backward
   compatibility issues associated with the procedures introduced in
   this document arise when a head-end LSR receives a PCRep with an ERO
   containing a PKS, and it does not know how to encode this into
   signaling.

   Since the PCE that inserted the PKS is required to keep the CPS
   confidential, the legacy head-end LSR cannot be protected.  It must
   either fail the LSP setup, or request a new path computation avoiding
   the domain that has supplied it with unknown subobjects.

7.  IANA Considerations

   IANA assigns values to PCEP parameters in registries defined in
   [RFC5440].  IANA has made the following additional assignments.

7.1.  New Subobjects for the ERO Object

   IANA has previously assigned an Object-Class and Object-Type to the
   ERO carried in PCEP messages [RFC5440].  IANA also maintains a list
   of subobject types valid for inclusion in the ERO.

   IANA assigned two new subobject types for inclusion in the ERO as
   follows:

   Subobject Type                                         Reference
             64   Path-Key with 32-bit PCE ID             [RFC5520]
             65   Path-Key with 128-bit PCE ID            [RFC5520]






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7.2.  New PCEP Object

   IANA assigned a new object class in the registry of PCEP Objects as
   follows.

   Object  Name          Object  Name                     Reference
   Class                 Type

   16    PATH-KEY        1       Path-Key                 [RFC5520]

       Subobjects
          This object may carry the following subobjects as defined
          for the ERO object.

                  64   Path-Key with 32-bit PCE ID        [RFC5520]
                  65   Path-Key with 128-bit PCE ID       [RFC5520]

7.3.  New RP Object Bit Flag

   IANA maintains a registry of bit flags carried in the PCEP RP object
   as defined in [RFC5440].  IANA assigned a new bit flag as follows:

   Bit Number  Hex       Name                             Reference
   23          0x000017  Path-Key (P-bit)                 [RFC5520]

7.4.  New NO-PATH-VECTOR TLV Bit Flag

   IANA maintains a registry of bit flags carried in the PCEP NO-PATH-
   VECTOR TLV in the PCEP NO-PATH object as defined in [RFC5440].  IANA
   assigned a new bit flag as follows:

   Bit Number      Name Flag                    Reference
   27              PKS expansion failure        [RFC5520]

8.  References

8.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC5440]  Vasseur, JP., Ed., and JL. Le Roux, Ed., "Path Computation
              Element (PCE) Communication Protocol (PCEP)", RFC 5440,
              March 2009.







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8.2.  Informative References

   [PCEP-MIB] Koushik, K., and E. Stephan, "PCE Communication Protocol
              (PCEP) Management Information Base", Work in Progress,
              November 2008.

   [RBNF]     Farrel, A., "Reduced Backus-Naur Form (RBNF) A Syntax Used
              in Various Protocol Specifications", Work in Progress,
              November 2008.

   [RFC3209]  Awduche, D., Berger, L., Gan, D., Li, T., Srinivasan, V.,
              and G. Swallow, "RSVP-TE: Extensions to RSVP for LSP
              Tunnels", RFC 3209, December 2001.

   [RFC4105]  Le Roux, J.-L., Ed., Vasseur, J.-P., Ed., and J. Boyle,
              Ed., "Requirements for Inter-Area MPLS Traffic
              Engineering", RFC 4105, June 2005.

   [RFC4216]  Zhang, R., Ed., and J.-P. Vasseur, Ed., "MPLS Inter-
              Autonomous System (AS) Traffic Engineering (TE)
              Requirements", RFC 4216, November 2005.

   [RFC4655]  Farrel, A., Vasseur, J.-P., and J. Ash, "A Path
              Computation Element (PCE)-Based Architecture", RFC 4655,
              August 2006.

   [RFC5152]  Vasseur, JP., Ed., Ayyangar, A., Ed., and R. Zhang, "A
              Per-Domain Path Computation Method for Establishing
              Inter-Domain Traffic Engineering (TE) Label Switched Paths
              (LSPs)", RFC 5152, February 2008.

   [RFC5298]  Takeda, T., Ed., Farrel, A., Ed., Ikejiri, Y., and JP.
              Vasseur, "Analysis of Inter-Domain Label Switched Path
              (LSP) Recovery", RFC 5298, August 2008.

   [RFC5441]  Vasseur, JP., Ed., Zhang, R., Bitar, N., and JL. Le Roux,
              "A Backward-Recursive PCE-Based Computation (BRPC)
              Procedure to Compute Shortest Constrained Inter-Domain
              Traffic Engineering Label Switched Paths", RFC 5441, April
              2009.

   [RSVP-PKS] Bradford, R., Vasseur, JP., and A. Farrel, "RSVP
              Extensions for Path Key Support", Work in Progress,
              February 2008.







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Acknowledgements

   The authors would like to thank Eiji Oki, Ben Campbell, and Ross
   Callon for their comments on this document.

Authors' Addresses

   Rich Bradford (Editor)
   Cisco Systems, Inc.
   1414 Massachusetts Avenue
   Boxborough, MA 01719
   USA
   EMail: rbradfor@cisco.com

   JP. Vasseur
   Cisco Systems, Inc.
   1414 Massachusetts Avenue
   Boxborough, MA 01719
   USA
   EMail: jpv@cisco.com

   Adrian Farrel
   Old Dog Consulting
   EMail: adrian@olddog.co.uk



























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